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Reflections upon Genre

Encounters between Literature, Knowledge, and Emerging Communicative Conventions

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Peter Widell

The Literary Text: Four Parameters

1 Introduction

This article is an attempt to shed light on the concept of the literal text using the British-American language philosopher Herbert Paul Grice's communication-based theory of language.[1] As will be seen, the following will not be a genre theory in the traditional sense of the word. I am not seeking a sort of genre- or text type-taxonomy. The theory I will present should rather be called a *parameter theory of the literary text*.[2] To be more specific, it is my intention to establish a set of four parameters characterizing literary texts. These parameters I will call, respectively, *figurativity*, *tropicity*, *fictionality* and *degree of realism* (or sometimes, for short, *realism*). The reason for calling my theory a parameter theory is grounded in the fact that it is possible for each and every *text segment*, literary or non-literary, ranging from the size of single speech act to the size of a whole text,[3] to ask whether it is characterized by a

[1] Cf. Grice (1959), reprinted in Grice (1989: 213–222); Grice (1975), reprinted in Grice (1989: 22–40).

[2] Without being identical with Gérard Genette's concept of mode, my parameter theory is inspired by Genette's distinction between mode and genre where mode according to Genette is a term reserved for the more universal features of texts while genre is a more complex/ususally referring to historically specific text types, cf. Genette (1992 (French 1977)). [term ①

[3] My parameters should first and foremost be seen as analytical concepts, i.e. as precise instruments for characterizing any text segment in any text. In the following, I will be describing my parameters exclusively in this sense.
In order to avoid misunderstandings and accusations of being naive, it should be pointed out that my concept of analyticity does not imply that we cannot find borderline cases, that is cases where it is difficult to determine whether we are dealing with, for instance, a piece of fictionality or not. Of course, we can. But it implies that (a) the concept itself will always be clear and distinct (as a necessary precondition for measuring borderline cases as borderline cases) and that (b) it will – despite occurrences of borderline cases – normally be possible to find distinct and clear core cases (cf. Grice & Strawson (1957); reprinted in Grice (1989: 196–212); cf. also Searle (1969: 4–12)).
Even though the parameters should be seen mainly as analytical concepts, they could also be used as genre or text type concepts. But then they will be seen merely as prototypical concepts, that is as more quantitative and circumstantial means of characterizing a literary text as a whole – as when you are judging, for instance, Homer's epic poem The Iliad to be a figurative text because of its recurrent meter,

value on one or more of the four parameters as, for instance, a certain rhyme on the figurativity parameter, a metonymy, a synecdoche or an irony on the tropicity parameter, or a pastiche, a satire or a sort of phantasy on the fictionality and degree of realism parameters.[4]

As will be shown below, Grice's communicative language theory involves a special approach to text description.[5] Thanks to Grice it is possible both to give a precise definition of the overall distinction between non-literary prose and literature, and to highlight the numerous subordinate conceptual distinctions in genre theory – and actually in the whole field of rhetoric and stylistics in general – in light of a comprehensive, unifying and, in that sense, explanatory theory.

In what follows, I will first take a look on Grice's theory. Then I will try to give a preliminary characterization of the literary text by the four text parameters. After that, I will examine each of the four parameters thoroughly trying to find their true nature. The upshot of the examination will be that, if you have Grice in your pocket and have a thorough understanding of the concept of repetition, and if you furthermore choose a robust concept of realism, then the literary text will reveal itself as a tight system of repetitions at different levels of reality as a vibrant means for your aesthetic pleasure.

2 Grice's theory of implicature

According to Grice, all human communication is subject to certain universal norms ~~or – as he calls them – maxims~~. In his article "Conversation and Logic"[6] he tries to find out what these universal ~~maxims~~ consists of and which function they have in human communication. The point of departure for Grice is to state the fact that communication is impossible among persons

Gustave Flaubert's novel Madame Bovary (Flaubert 1859) to be a fictional and realistic text because of its overall fictionality and realism.

4 It is possible to refer to both the parameters and their values as styles or modes of presentation. Thus, it is all right to talk about a figurative or rhymed style, or a tropic or ironic style. Note that the distinction between the parameters and their values represents a clarification of the concept of style. Because of the status of my parameters it will be quite possible to talk not just about non-literal genres versus literary genres, but also about cross or hybrid genres between the non-literary and the literary as, for instance, faction, docudrama and auto-fiction. It will also be possible through my parameters to characterize non-literary texts, for instance political speeches, namely as more or less influenced by different literary styles (without, actually, being literary texts). Actually, it will even be possible to use my parameters to help pinpointing what we in normal non-literary prose intuitively identifies as good or bad writing.

5 In the following, I will – as a matter of convenience – refer to both texts and text segments as texts.

6 Grice (1975); reprinted in Grice 1989: 22–40.

who directly opposes each other. This means, according to Grice, that persons who communicate must be obeying a principle that ensures that the speaker's intention, in saying what he says, is understood by the hearer. This principle he calls *the cooperative principle*.[7]

Grice realizes that this principle can only be complied with if the speaker tacitly follows exactly four ~~rules~~ or – as he, inspired by Immanuel Kant's table of categories in Kant 2007 (1781): A80/B106, calls them – four maxims for successful communication. The maxims – which Grice calls, respectively, again with a loan from Kant, the maxims of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation* and *manner* – are (here in a slightly modified form):

1. Do not say too little or too much!
2. Speak the truth (or at least do not say what you know is untrue)!
3. Be relevant when you speak!
4. Speak clearly and distinctly (i.e. grammatically and semantically correct)!

Others have more tellingly called them the maxims of *informativeness*, *truthfulness*, *relevance* and *correctness*.[8] It is crucial to understand that these norms

7 The principle states: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." (Grice 1989: 26).

8 Grice does not formulate this fourth maxim quite the same way as I do. He instead in his formulation talks about being orderly and understands it in a much looser sense. In opposition to Grice, I want to tighten the maxim in such a way that it will be strictly related to meaning, and meaning again strictly related to truth. Actually, I want to see (propositional) meaning in such a way that it is directly connected to the truth conditions of the corresponding sentence, where these truth conditions should again be understood as the situations in the world that will make the sentence true. Or to flesh it out by an example: When I use the English sentence "The snow is white", I am using it according to the maxim of correctness if what I say is a grammatical English expression (which it, actually, is), and if it is used with a knowledge of how to use it to assert true propositions in situations where we have instances of white snow. Notice, that it does not mean that the sentence have to be true in the actual situation.
There has been a lot of discussion about whether the four maxims are on the same level, and whether they should be applied in a certain order. Searle writes: "[...] the four are not on a par. For example, the requirement of truthfulness is indeed an internal constitutive rule of the notion of a statement. It is a constitutive rule of statement making that the statement commits the speaker to the truth of the expression expressed. [...] But the other Gricean features are not like that. The standards of relevance, brevity, clarity, and so on, unlike truth, are not in that way internal to the notion of speech acts. They are all external constraints on the speech act coming from general principles of rationality and cooperation." (Searle 2002 (1992): 185). I agree with Searle, but – as indicated in my definition of correctness above – only partly: for me, correctness is as constitutive of speech act meaning as truthfulness is of propositional truth.

are not just (collectively) universal. But that they are, actually, as I understand them, *transcendentally co-present in each and every speech act*. This transcendental argument has, of course, to be defended against any scepticist. Unfortunately we do not have enough space to defend it here. But we can at least show the presence of the maxims in an example chosen at random: if I, for example, utter the sentence "The earth is round" as an answer to a question from the hearer about whether the earth is round or not (in an everyday context; scientifically speaking it is, of course, not round), my speech is both *informative* – the hearer gets precisely the information he needs – *truthful* – the earth is round – *relevant* – my utterance corresponds precisely to what the hearer seeks – and grammatically and semantically or, what we could call it too, *literally correct* – the words I am using are the words you are supposed to use in English if you want to say that the earth is round in that language.

Now, what is interesting and original about Grice's theory is not that he was the first to find and justify these four – as we can call them – *transcendental maxims* governing understanding-oriented communication. Several other philosophers have discovered roughly the same maxims – or at least what can be cast in a similar form. The interesting and original aspect of Grice's theory is rather his elucidation of how we use them when communicating. What he has discovered – and deserves special credit for – is that *we can have rational reasons for not living up to them.*

There can be various reasons why the sender does not always live up to the four maxims. For example, he may lack the ability to live up to them, e.g. because he is a child, or because he is tired or drunk, or he may lack the will to do it, e.g. because he wants to cheat the person he speaks with. None of these reasons, however, are reasons that serve to facilitate communication. Cheating requires, indeed, that you are able to make rational planning. But the purpose here can only be non-communicative: when cheating, the goal is precisely to hide your intentions, not to bring them forth.

Grice, however, discovers a kind of reason for not living up to the four maxims which not goes against communication but, actually, serves it and makes it more effective.

It follows from my definition of correctness that complying with the maxim of truthfulness normally presupposes that the maxim of correctness is followed.

As to informativeness and relevance, I consider these two maxims as related not so much to assertion and to other truth-evaluating acts, as to their instrumental embedding – giving us all sorts of perlocutionary acts (as the founding father of speech act theory, John L. Austin, calls them; cf. Austin 1962). That does not mean that they are of minor importance for conveying the content of what the speaker or author is trying to communicate to the hearer. But their function is merely regulative (cf. Searle (1969: 33–42) for a discussion of the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules).

In the following discussion, I will – unless it is explicitly indicated otherwise – tacitly presuppose the use of my modified Gricean maxims.

What kind of rational reason we are talking about can perhaps best be illustrated by an example borrowed not from Grice, but from the American philosopher and colleague John R. Searle:[9] when A in a restaurant wants the salt and turns to B with the words "Can you pass me the salt?" in order to get B to pass him the salt, A deliberately breaches, according to Searle, at least two of the four Gricean maxims. First, it is *not relevant* in the situation to ask B about his ability to pass him the salt; here, the relevant thing to do is to request B to do what A wants him to do. Secondly, it is not *informative*, either, in the situation to ask about B's abilities: to have the ability to pass the salt is indeed a prerequisite for passing the salt, but it is not a sufficient condition. Nevertheless, B will immediately, according to Searle, take what A says, as a request and henceforth as an example of successful communication.

But how can he do that? How can he consider something which is basically flawed and defective successful?

According to Searle (and Grice), the reason why A's request is successful shall be found in the fact that *A's defective utterance prompts or initiates B to make a certain sequence of inferences*. In the example, the sequence can, according to Searle, be seen as the following of five distinct inference steps:

1. By saying "Can you pass the salt?" A is not living up to the maxims of relevance and information.
2. B assumes that A acts cooperatively (because A normally does so).
3. *Therefore*, A probably says more than what his words literally means.
4. A's question can in the given situation be viewed as a question about whether B has the ability to pass him the salt.
5. *Ergo*: probably, A will ask B to pass him the salt.

That means: through the inference steps in (3) and (5), B is able to transform A's defective utterance to an utterance which – had it been explicitly formulated – would have been consistent with the cooperative principle and with Grice's maxims. The reason for operating with defective utterance, is in the effective Gricean sense that they can be used by the speaker to initiate a particular type of situation-bound, implicit inference by the hearer, in the present example an inference that goes from A's explicit remark "Can you pass me the salt?" to his implicit request for the salt.

This pattern is not only connected to indirect speech acts, as in our example (cf. note 7), but is quite general. It can be spelled out in the following five steps:

1. The speaker says something that does not meet the cooperative principle by deliberately breaching one or several maxims.

[9] Cf. Searle (1975), reprinted in Searle (1979b: 30–57). The shown example is an example of a special sort of implicature, discovered, described and dubbed "indirect speech act" by Searle.

2. B assumes that A acts cooperatively (because A normally does so).
3. *Therefore*, the speaker (probably) means more than he literally says.
4. The literally said paired with the what is going on in the speech situation, makes it possible to understand what is the speaker says as an utterance which – had it been explicitly formulated – would have satisfied the cooperative principle.
5. *Ergo*: the speaker has (probably) meant utterance Y.

The explanation of the fact that an utterance can be successful even if the words said do not meet the cooperative principle, is thus: the speaker intends with his defective utterance to initiate an implicit inference-pattern in the hearer.

Such a speaker-induced inference-pattern has Grice – alluding to the concept of implication – dubbed an *implicature*.[10]

The core of Grice's theory and the source of its originality shall be found in the special *double use of the cooperative principle* found here: first, the principle is *brought to use to identify a defect* in the form of a violation, deliberately breach or flouting of one or more of the above mentioned maxims. Then, secondly, it is *brought to use to produce the implicatures* which, if they were explicitly formulated, would have satisfied the maxims.

As to the effectiveness of the Gricean implicature, it can readily be seen from the example that implicatures helps speeding up communication: instead of doing everything explicitly in an attempt to live up to the cooperative principle, the speaker leaves it to the hearer to draw the appropriate inferences. And since thought is faster than words, there is a communicative profit to be gained by using implicatures. This profit is, according to Grice and Searle, the main reason why we use implicatures in the first place – and, in fact, implicatures occur in large numbers whenever we communicate.

There is also a risk in using implicatures. When the speaker leaves it to the hearer to guess the intended meaning of his words, there is obviously a greater danger of communication failure than if the speaker is behaving in full compliance with the cooperative principle. This risk is outweighed, though, by the fact that there are other advantages by using implicatures – also besides the purely economic benefits. Many of these benefits are of a more specific psychological nature.[11]

[10] Grice distinguishes between two kinds of implicatures, conventional and conversational implicatures, and among the conversational implicatures again between particularized and generalized implicatures. Without going into discussion of these subtypes, I will confine myself in this paper to speak only about the most common subtype, the conversational and particularized implicature. While the name is somewhat prickly and quite opaque in the context of what we will be discussing in this paper, I will simply call this subtype an implicature.

[11] To mention just one example of a more specific psychological advantage: it would be unbearable for the individual participants in a communicative engagement – and thus a disadvantage for the long-term maintenance of good communicative relations – if the participants strictly complied with the cooperative principle. It is important to have a certain space for negotiation among the conversation partners, a sort of interpretation gap where they can respect each other's dignity as persons and maintain each other's *face* as the American sociologist Erwin Goffman calls it, cf. Goffman (1955). But that is what implicatures can secure for us. Implicatures secure a sort of *communicative politeness* as Brown & Levinson has dubbed it (cf. Brown & Levinson 1986). This restraint on our communicative engagement Donald Davidson has tried to coin in a genuine communication ethical principle called the *Charity Principle* (cf. Davidson 1974). The principle sounds in all its simplicity (slightly modified compared to the original): remember always as hearer to be merciful to the speaker and try whenever you do not immediately understand his utterance to see it as an attempt to use implicatures. However simple this principle is, it has, actually, proved to be crucial for the long term insurance of the founding conditions of communication.

Grice's cooperative principle has also its aesthetic advantages.

As we have seen, implicature-based speech requires work from the side of the hearer: the hearer has to infer what the sender can mean by the words he expresses, but to draw such inferences can be challenging and demands a sort of mastery, and mastery is, actually, aesthetically pleasing.

But that is exactly where literature comes into play. In literature, it is precisely this possibility of using vague implicatures that are exploited *for aesthetic purposes*.[12]

3 The literary text

A literary text part is, to state my thesis briefly, a demonstration of four different ways of deliberately breaching the Gricean maxims. Generally seen, the definition is, as far as it goes, quite simple: while the non-literary prose text can be defined as a text that meets the maxims of informativeness, truthfulness, relevance and correctness, the literary text part can, conversely, be defined as a part where the speaker or writer deliberately violates one or more of these maxims *in order to achieve an aesthetic advantage*. The last words are crucial, because they point to a special form of these violations. Violations can also be found in non-literary prose-texts. But they are normally easily recovered by a few fixed inferences, as we have already seen demonstrated in our example with the salt. This is not so in the literary text. In literature, the texts

[12] This aesthetic purpose should not be confused with aesthetic experience. Aesthetic judgment involves purposeful activity, but is in itself pointless – or without interest, as Kant says (Kant 1952 (German 1790)). It is a judgment of taste which only serves – as Kant also puts it – the *disinterested wellbeing*: "Does what I am doing, taste good, or does it taste bad?" Or as Wittgenstein has expressed it – emphasizing the outer signs of the aesthetic judgment we all, experiencers as well as observers, share: "Do I feel like this": ☺ "or like this": ☹ (cf. Wittgenstein 1978 (1966): 4).

parts are dominated by implicatures that *require a lot additional inference work from the side of the hearer – or in written texts: from the side of the reader.*[13] In this respect, the literary implicatures can be characterized as more *loose*[14] than, for instance, the implicatures in indirect speech acts. They represent a considerably larger amount of "correct" interpretations, i.e. possible inferences from the side of the reader, and it is exactly here we can find what gives the literary text parts their aesthetic advantage or function, as we will call it.

Since a literary text part cannot as easily be put to rest on the narrow path of non-literary prose, it can in a sense be said to operate *parasitically* on the non-literary prose text.[15] What lies in this metaphor is simply that *the concept of the literary text part presupposes the concept of the ordinary non-literary prose text part* (in order to deliberately breach with the non-literary prose text part's standard conditions), *while the concept of the non-literary prose text part, conversely, contains no concept of literary text part.* This can be stated in the following radical thesis: whatever breaches with a non-literary prose text we will find in a text, this type of text will always represent a *permanent methodical reduction of the text from the domain of the literally expressed to the domain of inference based instrumental action.* This gives us the opportunity to see more clearly the connection between the implicatures of the literary text and its aesthetic function. Aesthetics is invariably linked with instrumental activities or results from instrumental activities – artifacts – as it is in painting or music.

First and foremost: aesthetic reactions are – as Kant puts it – not reactions to the world directly, and – one might add – not, either, to the world-oriented functions of linguistic expressions. Instead, the aesthetic judgments are, in Kant's words, *reflective.*[16] That is just another way of saying that the aesthetic judgment is a response to our instrumental activities dealing with things in the world. Furthermore, the judgment is always an emotional judgment. It concerns our feelings toward our activities. And this is where the concept of mastery, mentioned above, comes into play: if what we are doing involves a certain risk, then the skill to master it normally turns out to be a source of aesthetic pleasure. That means, in relation to texts, that we find aesthetic relevance not so much in the literal parts of the text where the cooperative principle is complied with, but in those parts where the principle is violated in various ways, and the capability to form and to draw inferences is challenged.

[13] Every text can be either an oral or a written text. It means that we can meet speakers and hearers or listeners as well as authors and readers. Since modern literary texts present themselves mostly in written form, I will mainly use the terms authors and readers in the following. It is important, though, to be aware of the fact that on the general level I am discussing in this article, it doesn't matter which medium – oral or written – you choose.

[14] Cf. Sperber & Wilson (1986). Cf. also Blakemore (1992: Ch. 7–9).

[15] Cf. Austin (1962: 51–52 & 127).

[16] Cf. Kant (1952 (German 1790): 18). The semantically based judgment is equivalent to Kant's determinative judgment.

Here, we will see that the principle can be challenged in two different dimensions of the text: in the textual *expression* – here we find the domain of the figurativity of the text – and in the textual *implicature* – here we find, respectively, the domain of tropicity, fictionality and realism in the text.

The question of whether a text part is literary in the formal sense is not to be confused with the question of whether it is a text part with literary *qualities,* i.e. whether it is a good or a bad literary text part. But even if it does not belong to the concept of literature that it is good or bad, *it remains, nevertheless, a feature of any literary text part that it is a potential object of aesthetic evaluation.*

But what does it mean? Do we have reliable standards of evaluation? Or are aesthetics just a matter of taste?

Kant has convincingly tried to show that although it is meaningless to evaluate individual art works as good or bad based on some absolute scale – here we humans can only act *recommendatory* according to Kant if we want to influence others to a certain aesthetic attitude – the aesthetic judgment is, nevertheless, not subjective. It is, actually, as Kant asserts, possible as a generalization over form on the one hand and aesthetic appreciation on the other hand. It is here we find the judgement of the beautiful as a judgement of a *free play* between imagination and understanding[17] or – to skip the rather special Kantian terminology and choose more modern terms – between being challenged in our instrumental activities on the one hand and showing mastery of those instrumental activities on the other hand.[18]

This also seems to hold in literature. Here, literarity seems to retain a certain aesthetic value across various literary orientations, schools, and epochs. This applies to *figurativity* to *tropicity,* to *fictionality* and to *literary realism* alike.

[17] Cf. Kant (1952 (German 1790): 50). An example may illustrate what is meant by Kant's formulation here: While a square or a circle immediately can be determined respectively as a square or as a circle via the simple concept of a square or a circle, foliage on a frame or a tapestry (Kant 1952 (German 1790): 60) is not immediately determinable through a simple concept. Here, the foliage rather gestalts itself as something with smooth edges without being a square or as something with curved lines without being a circle, i.e. as a foliage sensed as something that cannot be subordinated to a simple concept, but exists in a strange floating state between several possible simple concepts. This floating state is the state Kant is referring to when he talks about the existence of a *free play* between perception (belief) and concept. It is this state which, according to Kant, is the true source of aesthetic pleasure.

[18] In these formulations I have been inspired by Wittgenstein who calls the aesthetic judgement: "[...] something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated activity." (Wittgenstein 1966: § 11).

Below, we will take a closer look at these four parameters to see how they are able to characterize literary texts. As we will see, the parts all have their special internal structure and a special role to play. Although they are not directly constitutive of the literature as an aesthetic object – we cannot exclude that other things may have influence on what we find aesthetically commendable – they are, nevertheless, as close to being constitutive of an aesthetic text as we can get: they all give us opportunities to show excellence; and to show excellence is – that is what Kant tells us – aesthetically pleasing.

4 Figurativity

By figurativity as a feature of a literary text we will understand the different kinds of repetitive shaping or patterning of the textual expression. Figurativity can always be reduced to patterns of simple or complex repetitions in the textual expression such as are known from e.g. rhyme and metre.

The non-literary text must meet, as we have seen, the requirements of informativeness, truthfulness, relevance and grammatical and semantic correctness. This means that the textual expression of normal non-literary prose is more or less perceived as characterized by *a lack of conspicuous repetitive shapes or patterns.*

Let me spell out what it means.

If you are pre-occupied complying with the Gricean maxims – and this goes for the authors and readers alike – then repetitive shapes and patterns not grounded in the Gricean maxims will occur as a purely irrelevant and perhaps even disturbing feature of a certain text. We can, of course, always ornate a non-literary text with rhyme, meter etc., and by the feature of figurativity alone turn a text into a literary text. There have, actually, been times, for instance in the Baroque Period, where it was welcomed to ornate applications, recommendations and appointments – i.e. texts otherwise trying to live up to the Gricean maxims.

But, it is exactly in this opportunity to meet all the Gricean maxims we find figurativity slightly different from the other literary text parameters. This parameter is not concerned with textual content, as the Gricean maxims normally are, but only with the figurative features of a text. Therefore this parameter is not *constituted* by the Gricean maxims as the other ones. Its presence in a text is only an *indication of* the possibility that we are standing in front of a text constituted by breaches of the Gricean maxims.[19]

[19] Actually, whether the text is just *indicating* or actually *showing* a deliberate breaching of the modified Gricean maxims, depends upon whether you choose Grice's more relaxed definition of correctness, his manner maxim, or the more strict definition I am preferring according to which "correctness" is a matter of grammatical and semantic correctness alone. Grice would certainly have considered texts showing figures and patterns as a violation of his maxim of manner.

Figurativity is not just a textual phenomenon. It is the hallmark of perception in general, reflecting our goals and interests in our actions. Since we always focus on something or other in perception, every perceptual act is, by its very nature, structured as *a figure on a ground.* Of course, we have most of the time to obtain complex information from our surroundings. But figures can be connected by being iteratively repeated. They can form *repetitive patterns* that again can be seen as figures – now complex ones – on certain backgrounds. When monitoring a room, for instance, the whole process can be seen as a repetitive pattern of simple perceptual acts where I first look at the table, then look on the things on the table, then at the lamp and so forth, until I have gathered sufficient information – e.g. satisfying the conditions for whatever I want to do next.

The figures of figurativity are perceptually given figures. That does not, however, mean that repetitions have to be confined to the same perception situation. They can be distributed over many perception situations, only limited, actually, by the memory capacity of the perceiving subject.

The simplest repetitive pattern you can envisage is, of course, two figures on a ground as exemplified in the two figures below:



Fig. 1: Two figures on a ground

Fig. 1 shows a noteworthy fact about perception, namely that each and every conceivable repetition is subject both to: (a) *configurativity*, the overall presence of two or several figures in time and space, (b) *comparability* (in terms of a possibility of similarity or difference) between every two figures in the repetitive pattern. Actually, these features will always show up *whenever a perceiving subject moves through distinguishable, uniformly shaped (=comparability) mutually related (=configurativity) single instances.* The repetition – with its two constitutive features – is so fundamental that we cannot go behind it or escape it: it is not empirical; it is, actually, transcendental.[20] In its most ab-

It could also be argued, as I have already indicated that to ornate a text is to bring features to the text in question that hinders or delays an effective overall understanding of the content of the speech acts in the text. So in that sense figurativity could be seen as a violation of the maxim of relevance and could, therefore, be ranked as a parameter in line with the other parameters. Here we still have to emphasize that we are, then, only dealing with pure expression, not with content.

[20] This should be emphasized against a merely psychological interpretation found for instance among the Gestalt Theorists (Wertheimer, Köhler, Kofka). They were the

stract form it is just our gaze into the world: focus number one, focus number two. In that sense, we are always confronted with three things: number, location and the question of similarity or not.

On closer examination it turns out that we have not just a twofold distinction in (b), but a threefold distinction. If you compare Fig. 1 with the figure below:



Fig. 2: Two figures on a ground

you have not just a distinction between the similar and the different, but a distinction between (i) *the (qualitatively) identical*, (ii) *the similar* or *the varied*[21] and (iii) *the different*: in fig. 1 you have an *identical repetition* consisting of two *identical* figures, in fig. 2 you have a *varied repetition* consisting of two *similar* figures.

The fact that you always can demonstrate a threefold distinction in your perception and action between the identical, the similar and the different must not be conflated with the question of *when* you are seeing things as identical, as just similar, or as completely different. The last question is an empirical-pragmatic question, not a metaphysical one. The question whether two forms or two colors are identical or just similar, is a question of exactness and a question of how you want to use the distinction.

The same goes for the configurativity of the figures. Here, the topological and metrical relationships between the figures – are they overlapping or not, are they far from each other or close to each other? – are metaphysical relationships while questions about, for instance, the actual distance between the figures and the occurrence of deformations in relation to certain standard measures are purely empirical-pragmatic questions.[22]

pioneers behind the idea of perception as a perceiving of figures governed by certain *gestalt laws* adding wholes to our perceptual inputs. This kind of psychologism represents an unacceptable kind of antirealism. Figures (on grounds) are not something added to the world by our perceptions. Figures are basically out there in the world.

[21] Usually, you talk about *identity* and *contrast* (cf. e.g. Leech (1969: 65–66)). Here, contrast is subsumed under the category of the similar, not of the different. Contrast is not negation, but modification.

[22] Depending on the situation, the actual distance between two or several figures can be felt as so great that the configurativity of the participating figures, actually, dissolves. Therefore, a hidden premise is usually attached to the concept of configurativity, namely that the part figures in a configuration should not be located too far from each other. Or to use a technical term: they should bear the characteristic of *contiguity*, due to limitations in our perceptual apparatus.
As to degree of similarity between figures, transformations such as inversion or litotic repetition are normally considered to preserve an underlying identity.

As indicated above, complex patterns can be seen as repetitions of repetitions. They are iterative. Thus, a complex pattern such as the pattern in fig. 3 can, for instance, be seen as a simple repetition of two repetitions:

Fig. 3: Simple repetition

Instead of simple repetitions we also can have varied repetitions as in fig. 4:

Fig. 4: Varied repetitions

Here, the variation consists – in the presentation of slightly different ovals in the end of each member – of the two parts of the repetition.

Now, what about texts? Since textual expressions are patterns, they exhibit the same characteristics as any other pattern. But textual expressions, of course, are special. The first thing to notice is that texts are man-made objects carrying meanings. Therefore, they usually consist of linear sequences of spoken or written signs. This puts some restraints on how the repetitive patterns may look like. For instance, they are not just patterns of acts of perceiving, they have a special shape dictated by the used material which in the case of spoken signs are sounds made by the human throat and in the case of written signs are graphic figures ultimately consisting of letters. Spoken sounds are the primary medium in language use. Since written signs partly represents oral sounds – the letter "a" represents a certain oral sound, the letter "b" another and so forth – the sound patterns of a text corresponds by and large to

its graphic pattern (at least in phonetically based writing systems). Therefore, we find the same text patterns in both kinds of texts.

But which repetitive shapes and patterns do we, actually, find in texts? Here, we must distinguish between the material the patterns are made of, and the patterns themselves. Concerning the material, we find sounds and pauses, we find different sound qualities, that is vowels and consonants, and we find relevant variation in stress, length and pitch. Concerning patterns, we find simple and varied repetitions in sound groups, as for instance end-rhymes, alliterations and assonances, and we find simple and varied, non-complex and complex repetitions of different stress/length/pitch-profiles, as for instance in iambic, trochaic and dactylic styles.[23]

In classical stylistics, there has been put in great effort in establishing a taxonomy characterizing every possible repetitive pattern in a text. Below, is a text – some lines from the Danish poet Hans Adolf Brorson's poem *Her vil ties, her vil bies* – presenting a little sample of those repetitive patterns – referred to by their technical names from classical stylistics:

Her vil ties, her vil bies

Her vil bies, O svage Sind

Vist skal du hente, kun ved at vente

Kun ved at vente, vor Sommer ind



Fig. 5: Repetitive patterns[24]

[23] It is also possible to find semantically and pragmatically motivated repetitions, carrying highly abstract meanings, repetitions like words (as words tout court), sentences (as sentences tout court), paragraphs, bulleted lists etc. They are, of course, in itself manifestations of a figurative order in the text (and hence possible objects of aesthetic appreciation), but, normally, they are not sufficient salient to transform the whole text to be a literary text.

[24] Poem in rough English translation: "Here will be silence; here will be waiting; here will be waiting, O soul so weak; surely, you will be gaining, but only by waiting; only by waiting for the summer to arrive." Cf. Brorson (1765).

All this seems also to be linked to the aesthetic judgment and our ability to feel aesthetic pleasure and pain. If we find patterns in our environment in relation to our wants and needs, we also find an opportunity to create challenging situations which require a certain amount of skill. It is precisely here we are able to apply Kant's thinking from earlier about the relationship between the free play and the beauty to the sentence and to the text.

But before we do this, I want to develop Kant's theory a little bit further towards *a more comprehensive phenomenology of the aesthetic sense revealing a certain dynamic*: on the one hand we lack pattern and order in our existence, or it is too complex, which implies an inability to master the situation, and this leads – other things being equal – to *worry* and perhaps *anxiety*. On the other hand we have that the orderly and all too expected and monotonous, which – other things being equal – leads to *boredom*. And in the middle we have the skillful – not too dull, not too risky – mastery that creates exactly the Kantian beauty. [25] Beauty is, in that sense, in our more comprehensive phenomenology a balance point between boredom and anxiety.[26]

It is important to notice that this balance point – together with the whole scale from the monotonous to the chaotic – always has to be considered relative to a certain culture, a certain group, a certain person. As we have already cited Kant for: aesthetics do not have any absolute standards. And this, indeed, also applies to sentences and texts. As a good illustration of a lack of an objective balance point of beauty concerning sentences and texts, is the observation that varying periods throughout history have had their own favored

[25] Even if this dialectics between (a) monotony leading to boredom, (b) free play leading to beauty, and (c) the chaotic leading to worry and anxiety is not as explicitly formulated in Kant as it is here, something similar seems to underlie his theorizing: actually, in Kant (2005 (German 1790): 165), he talks about monotony and boredom; and in his theory of the sublime, partly inherited from Edmund Burke (1990 (1757)), he quite unmistakably approaches the borderline to the chaotic and the fearful (Kant 2005 (German 1790): 92–94).

[26] These links between the cognitive and the emotive in the aesthetic judgement could, perhaps, be given an explanation in evolutionary terms. Before the invention of written language human memory was the only storage medium for knowledge. But, here, an artificially inflicted shaping of the material to be remembered, involved a cognitive-economic advantage and, thereby, an efficient means for survival. Concomitantly, these shapes and patterns enhanced the feeling of mastery that came with it. Memorizing was much easier which in itself was aesthetically pleasant.
With the rise of written language, this aesthetic feeling of being worn by "another security" became much more conspicuous, and the new medium's increased storage capacity allowed definitely greater degrees of craftsmanship. The oral presentation with its inability to create a distance between *production time* and *presentation time* of a text was replaced by a presentation that allowed infinite opportunities to refine the treatment. All these developments undoubtedly contributed to a sophistication of the aesthetic expression.

attitude to the patterning of sentences and texts, perhaps best exemplified by the Romantic breach with the classical form ideal, where the ambition was to try to test all patterns in the text against strict rules listed in various stylistics and rhetoric books. This was, in the Romantic period, felt as artificial, as overloaded, as mechanical, and – yes, ultimately – as a little bit too boring.

Some uses of figures are worthwhile mentioning: for instance, it is possible to let parts of figures in a text represent focus points, which can be open to semantic interpretation. Thus, the Danish words "ties" and "bies" (twice) meaning, respectively, "silence" and "waiting" (cf. fig. 5), can be used to elicit special non-semantic connotations or associations between the two words. But, it has to be remembered that such focus points have nothing to do with attending to the figurativity pattern itself. It would be to *add* something to the figurativity of the text: a looser reading breaching with the Gricean maxims. Often, rhymes go together with sentences, and – thereby – with what sentences represent. But, when looking for figurativity proper, we are not looking for meaning, but only for patterns in the text expression.

Another use of figurativity is letting it imitate human bodily movement. This brings figurativity close to music and dance. Like music and dance, figurativity in texts can be seen as a means of expressing emotion. Frequent repetitions with short time intervals can express unrest, excitement, enthusiasm or joy, whereas frequent repetitions with longer time intervals can express rest, relaxation, sleepiness or mourning and so forth. Besides these feelings, a poem can also have its aesthetic point. Just as a certain dance can manifest itself as an eloquent expression of sorrow, so can the rhymes of a particular poem. In that sense, the figurative aspect of the poem can imitate or mime what the poem is about which is one of the reasons why you cannot so easily separate representation from represented in literature.

5 Tropicity

By tropicity as a feature of a literary text we will understand the different kinds of tropes in the text – that is pragmatically triggered acknowledgements of repetitions in the world referred to by the textual trope, for instance Achilles and the lion in the well-known Aristotle-metaphor "The lion (e.g. Achilles) leapt".[27] The repetitions in tropes are always – as part of the understanding of the metaphor – considered with regard to either similarity, contiguity or both.

In fig. 5 we have seen different repetitions in the textual expression "translated" into a sort of painting, so to speak. In this section we will look upon its manifestation in relation to *meaning contents*. Here, meaning presents itself as a special kind of repetition. In that respect you can say that tropicity is a repe-

[27] Aristotle Rhetoric 406b, in Aristotle (1984: 2243).

tition of the figurative repetition, but now in the realm of semantics and – as we will see – even pragmatics.[28]

To understand what that means, it is necessary to be familiar with the ordinary repetition of meaning content or, as we are going to call it, *literal meaning*.

The hallmark of the repetition of meaning content in literal meaning shall be seen in a satisfactory first time application of the Gricean maxims. We have previously seen that these maxims ensure that our speech acts are informative, truthful, relevant and (grammatically and semantically) correct.

Concerning literal meaning, it is important to notice that it is, in principle, possible to speak about things and situations in the world without presupposing any language based meaning at all. It is, actually, possible to establish *ad hoc meaning* or – as Grice calls it – *occasion meaning*.[29] But leaving this borderline case of meaning aside, we normally expect that people we discuss with will be able to identify the permanent meaning of the words said. We, actually, expect that our interlocutor is able to identify what is said *as a repetition*, namely a repetition of what happened in the *baptizing situation* where he for the first time learned how to use the words meaningfully. To know what the meaning of the sentence "The earth is round" is, is, then, basically to be able to assert a true proposition about the roundness of the earth in all situations *(qualitatively) identical* to the baptizing situation – that is, in all subsequent *use situations*. Without digging deeper into the question of what must be satisfied for such a repetition to take place – this, actually, requires a more comprehensive speech act theoretical approach[30] – it should be relatively obvious, that *the maxim of semantic correctness* – as an insurance of *the baptizing situation's repetition in the use situation* – is complied with by the speaker, and thus *also the maxim of truthfulness* which in the first place gives the linguistic meaning a supporting platform: when saying "The earth is round", what you do is, actually, *repeating* something you have said before.[31] But this repeating is also a repeating in the sense that the expression *you truthfully*

[28] That means that the repetition cannot any longer be aggregated in simple perceptual acts, as it often can with respect to figurativity.

[29] Cf. Grice (1959: 213–224).

[30] I have tried to implement such an approach in Widell (2001; 2009; 2010), inspired partly by Saul Kripke who in Kripke (1981) coined the expression "baptizing situation", and partly by Austin who in Austin (1979 (1950)) talks about truth as fixated by pairings of demonstrative and descriptive conventions.

[31] Note, that this does not violate the Fregean Principe of Compositionality. Even if the sentence "The earth is round" is used with the exact wording for the first time, it still represents a repetition according to the Fregean Context Principle. Of course, it can, then, not be seen as an instance of an identical repetition, but only as an instance of a varied repetition.
As a special case, a varied repetition always presents *in any use situation* the repetition of the logical form of the sentence, that is the form "R(A, B, C...)".

used as an expression of the perception of a certain configuration of things in the world was used the same way as you did it in the baptizing situation.[32]

This is precisely the relationship that forms the basis for understanding the creation of language meaning and *the analyticity or literalness of concepts* – e.g. the property of concepts that they can be related to each other without reference to empirical knowledge – such as the relation of 'man' (used in a baptizing situation) to 'man' (used in a corresponding use situation), the relation of 'bachelor' to 'unmarried person' (synonymy) and 'monkey' to 'animal' (hyperon/my) in English.[33]

That is, as we will see, also the basis for understanding the creation of tropes in texts.

But what about the tropes? What do they consist in? And how are we going to characterize them?

Literal texts are meaningful to the extent that they will double the perceptual and action-related event that has occurred in the baptizing situation. This is, however, not the case with tropes. The point of departure for understanding tropes is a deliberate *breaching of* or *flouting* this pattern. Here, we are exactly *not* invoking the internal relationship between baptizing situation and use situation but, instead, *simply comparing – initiated by an understanding of the words of the trope – figures located entirely in the world.* In a sense, the situation is the same as in our poem in fig. 5. But there is a difference: the figures we are, now, concentrating on have changed from a comparing of the letters and words in the poetic expression to a comparing of real figures out there in the world alluded to *by* the words we are using. To repeat fig. 1 here:



Fig. 6: Two figures on a ground

[32] This means that a sentence reflecting the structure of a proposition at the same time reflects the structure of perception. That is one of the reasons why Frege is founding his logic not just on the sentence, not even just on the sentence used in a certain situation, but on the *thought* covering both the structure of sentences and the structure of perception and – especially – action: "One brings about changes in the common outside world which perceived by another person, are supposed to induce him to apprehend a thought and take it to be true." (Frege 1997b (German 1918–1919): 29). Here – in thought – we always find the following recurring structure: On the one hand a certain reference and on the other hand a certain way for this reference to be presented (Frege 1997a (German 1882)).

[33] Cf. note 3.

The figures should, now, be seen not as figures of expression in language, but as figures in the world.

A popular example in the theoretical literature on metaphor can illustrate this. If Romeo says "Juliet is the sun" – that is, if Romeo use the well known metaphor from Shakespeare's play *Romeo and Juliet* – he uses the words "Juliet" and "is" according to the semantic norms established in the baptizing situation for the correct use of the two words. Here, the use situation resumes – is a *repetition* of – the baptizing situation. But the word "sun" is used quite differently. It is, actually, seen as an invitation from the side of the author to his audience to watch the sun – the actual sun *out there in the world* – as repeated in the actual Juliet – the actual Juliet *out there in the world.*[34]

It is exactly the nature of this repetition that, throughout history, has been the central topic of discussion in the illumination of the trope and its many different manifestations.[35]

Let us first look at the so called master trope, the metaphor. [36] Later on we will turn to some of the other main tropes and their interrelations. As a starting point for such an examination, we can, roughly, say – and I think profitably – that the metaphor consists of three separate parts: a *marker*, a *mechanism* and a *literal paraphrase*. Here, we find, though, a divide concerning the importance, or even necessary existence, of each of the three parts between two different groups of metaphor theorists, which we, in the following, will call, respectively, the Communication Theorists, and the Cognitive Semanticists. While the Communication Theorists adhere to the conception that the three parts exist as analytically given, necessary parts of the concept of metaphor, the Cognitive Semanticists are of the opinion that only the mid part is necessary while the marker and the mechanism are dispensable parts superficially connected to the metaphorical expression.

[34] It is important to notice that the fact that we have moved the repetition from the textual expression to the textual content, now, means that the second object of the comparison can be absent. The reader often has to imagine the second object (per implicature). That is not the case when we are dealing with figurativity.

[35] The metaphor is, in the classical tradition from Aristotle to Quintilian, defined as an *abbreviated* comparison (elliptical simile). This means that it is presupposed in the classical tradition that the origin of the metaphor lies in *the comparison* (simile) of *two concrete figures* (or two concrete configurations).
That goes even for metaphorical expressions not directly expressing a comparison. In the metaphor "He was a pig" "a pig" is referring to a pig chosen at random. Still, the interpreter of the metaphorical expression has to imagine *a concrete pig* if he wants to establish the comparison relation (which is, of course, always possible: the interpreter can always refer back to *the concrete pig* of the baptizing situation for the word "pig").

[36] Since metaphor is considered to be the main trope, or the master trope, you often use the term "metaphor" instead of "trope" for all types of tropes. However, we would prefer to use the term "trope" here for the area as a whole, and then reserve the term metaphor exclusively for what in the tradition appears under that name.

The marker. Those who especially pay attention to the marker of the metaphor, the Communication Theorists, tend also to believe that metaphor should be seen as *a special type of implicature.*[37] Within the communicative paradigm, a metaphor is not a metaphor unless the author has the intention and the ability to create a marker by which the audience can identify this intention. Therefore, the main question for the Communication Theorists is: how do we, in general, recognize markers of metaphors in communicative engagements? How do we know, for example, that there is a metaphor hidden in "Juliet is the sun"?

Here, the answer, according to the Communication Theorists, is straightforward: we know this because Grice's maxim of correctness is deliberately breached or flouted by the speaker or writer. And so it always is, according to the Communication Theorists, when faced with metaphors: metaphors are simply marked, from the side of the author, as a special kind of *violation of Grice's maxim of correctness.*[38] To give an example that will reveal this: Juliet in "Juliet is the sun" is not – and could not be – the sun in any meaningful sense of the word. Juliet is not a huge ball of burning gas in outer space. So the author is not using the word "sun" according to the semantic rules for the word. He has intentionally or deliberately breached the Gricean maxim of correctness. Or – to take another example – when the recently deceased Danish author Inger Christensen in her sonnet circle *The Butterfly Valley* (2004 (1991): 4) speaks about "the dense crimson hue of life", we again have just another instance of flouted speech: life is not densely colored. So, the author is not using the words "dense", "crimson" and "hue" according to a possible literal meaning of these words. She has intentionally or deliberately breached the Gricean maxim of correctness.

The trope markers can be of different types. Here, metaphor is the most central one. But we can also have other types of tropes, types like *metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole* and *litotes,* as well as types like *irony, sarcasm, tautology* and *symbol.* Together this family of tropes forms, according to the Communication Theorists, a beautiful system of breaches of the various Gricean maxims.

[37] Adherents of the communicative metaphor theory are among others Grice (cf. Grice 1975), Searle (cf. Searle 1979a), Sperber & Wilson (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1983; 1986) and Glucksberg (2001).

[38] The fact that metaphors represent a deliberate breaching of the maxim of correctness has led some scholars to abstain from using the term 'implicature' in connection with metaphors; reserving the concept implicature for post-propositional inferences, they instead see metaphors as a sort of explicatures (cf. for example Bach (2001: 253, note 3)).
Grice himself (Grice 1989 (1975): 34) perceives of tropes, including metaphors, as implicatures. We will follow this practice. As we have chosen to consider implicature as a kind of umbrella concept covering all deliberate breaches of the modified Gricean maxims, we are protected against any inconsistency here.

Metaphors are forming a special group of tropes together with metonymies, synecdoche's, hyperboles, and litotes. What holds for the marker of the metaphor holds for the markers of all the other tropes too: they are all characterized by having a marker constituted by a deliberate *flouting of the maxim of correctness.* The things talked about are either too fragmented – that goes for metaphor and metonymy – too large – that goes for hyperboles – or too small – that goes for litotes.

But we also have use for the other Gricean maxims. Contrary to the above group of tropes, irony and sarcasm have a marker constituted by a deliberate *flouting of the maxim of truth.* For tautology we have a marker constituted by a *flouting of the maxim of informativeness* and for symbol and allegory a marker formed as a *flouting of the maxim of relevance.*[39]

Thus, all Gricean maxims come, actually, into full play in the shaping of the various tropes.

The mechanism. The mechanism of the metaphor is the ball game for those who think that metaphor is a purely cognitive matter – that is for the Cognitive Semanticists.[40] They therefore attach minor importance to the communicative side of the metaphor. Actually, the metaphor itself has, according to the Cognitive Semanticists, nothing to do with texts at all. Metaphors, of course, could have a metaphorical expression in texts, so they recognize language markers, but they do not need to have any language marker. They need not even to be communicated: "The generalizations governing

[39] As to symbol and allegory: when, for instance, in Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale "The Ugly Duckling" (Andersen 1844), we are reading about the duckling – on the basis of a metaphorical interpretation of the speech and behavior of the duckling (personification) – we are also reading about the general conditions of being a person misplaced or maladapted in the world. It's important here to notice that this symbolic or allegorical interpretation covering the text as a whole is not prompted by any inconsistency or breach in the *semantics* of the text such as in metaphor and metonymy. To see the inconsistency you have to include the whole context: "Why are we being told this silly story about an ugly duckling which is, actually, a swan? It seems totally irrelevant to me." Or does it? Perhaps Andersen has meant his fairy tale to be a lesson about life, about what is possible for a genius born under unfortunate circumstances. But this interpretation has its point of departure, not in a violation of the maxim of semantical correctness, but instead in a violation of the modified Gricean maxims, here relevance.
This definition of symbol and allegory has side-effects on our conception of some metaphors: a trope like "He stabbed me in my back" is, just to mention an example, often – when no literal interpretation is possible in the situation – classified as a metaphor; but since this does not represent a flouting of the maxim of correctness, but rather of the maxim of relevance, it should, rather, be classified as a symbol.

[40] Adherents of this cognitive conception of metaphor are among others Lakoff and Johnson (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980), Lakoff and Turner (cf. Lakoff & Turner 1988), Gibbs (cf. Gibbs 1994) and Turner and Fauconnier (cf. Turner & Fauconnier 2000).

poetic metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in thought [...] the locus of metaphor is not in language at all [...]" (Lakoff 1993: 203).

Metaphors are, according to the Cognitive Semanticists, *cognitive mappings from a source domain to a target domain* (Lakoff & Turner 1988: 63), and they are, in this respect, extensively structured. "Juliet is the sun", for instance, is not just a similarity between the sun and Juliet. It is a mapping determined by a vast underlying, cognitively structured system of correspondences between source and target domains. The sun is not just our conception of the sun. It also comprises our conception of the earth, the heaven, and all the other heavenly bodies: the moon, Mars, Venus etc. It is this system, and not only the sun itself that creates metaphorical meanings to our experiences. It brings, for instance, the sun to the centre of our planet system; it makes the sun a distant place; it gives us the pale moon at night; it gives us a dark side of the moon etc., furthering our thoughts with a plethora of opportunities to create still new correspondences to, in this case, the vast field of human relations. Finally, our thoughts are, according to the Cognitive Semanticists, founded on one huge coherent, hierarchical structured conceptual system of source domains mapped into target domains: "the Great Chain of Being" (cf. Lakoff & Turner 1988: 160–213).

Contrary to the Communication Theorists, the Cognitive Semanticists put great effort in scrutinizing the way we are building larger systems of metaphors, and in that sense they have, without doubt, contributed to the illumination of how we build metaphors.

The Communication Theorists have, however, in their attempt to maintain a conceptually necessary distinction between marker and mechanism, questioned whether the Cognitive Semanticists have the right conception of what they are doing in their examinations. For instance, the Cognitive Semanticists claim that their theory is a real, scientifically-based, psychological theory about a text and a communication independent basis for creation of metaphors. That is their major claim. But that calls for text and communication independent confirmation instances. However, according to the Communication Theorists, the Cognitive Semanticists have never really succeeded in establishing such confirmation instances.[41] Therefore, what the Cognitive Semanticists are doing should rather, according to the Communication Theorists, be seen as a mixture of philosophical reconstruction and hermeneutical interpretation.[42]

[41] Cf. Verveake & Kennedy (1996), Murphy (1996), McGlone (2001). I think this criticism is still forceful and sound.
There have been resent attempts to show that time is structured as space, not by language, but by a deep language-independent metaphorical cognitive mapping (cf. Borodinsky 2000; Casasanto, Fotakopoulou & Boroditsky 2010; Merritt, Casasanto & Brannon 2010). These attempts are not convincing, simply because they are not as claimed attempts at examining the concept of time at all. Time is – and should be seen – as a metaphysical concept necessarily connected to space and to our acting and perceiving in the world. It is not an empirically concept, separately verifiable. It is transcendentally given – as a prerequisite for all cognition involving time.

But that leaves us with the Communication Theorists interpretation of the metaphorical mechanism: What the Cognitive Semanticists consider as deep, language and communication independent psychological mental mappings from source areas to target areas could, according to the Communication Theorists, equally well be understood as a seeking for local similarities between things and processes in the world *prompted by a breaking of a Gricean maxim*. This interpretation is so much the better as it will, furthermore, confirm and preserve the Gricean realist presumptions of the concept of *literal talk*, namely that it consists of talk, not about what is going on in our heads, but instead about real things in the world laying out there for us to perceive and act on, and it will preserve the classical presumptions of how we understand metaphors, namely as *local answers* to questions of similarities between figures in the world revealing different sorts of simple and varied repetitions normally on the level of what can be expressed in a single sentence.[43]

The (literal) paraphrase. According to the Communicative Theorists, a metaphor cannot exist as metaphor without being connected to a literal paraphrase. The Cognitive Semanticists on their side dismiss this presumption. For the Cognitive Semanticists, as for the theorists in the Romantic tradition, metaphors are not just reducible to their paraphrases. They have creative potential. The underlying mental mappings of source domains to target domains add, according to the Cognitive Semanticists, something to our understanding of things and events in the world that we do not have a grip on independently of the metaphor. There are – the Cognitive Semanticists admit – metaphor independent source domains that serve as points of departures for metaphor creation. A sentence like "The cat is on the mat" is, according to the Cognitive Semanticists, quite literal. But for metaphors, as for instance the metaphor "Juliet is the sun", there are no literal interpretations, no paraphrases. And the same goes for all the areas of our experience where we are not able to refer directly to the physical world.

This argument is, however, contested by the Communication Theorist: The distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning is not a contingent

[42] As to the last point McGlone writes: "Lakoff and his colleagues base the metaphoric representation claim solely on intuitions about how certain idioms thematically cohere." (McGlone (2001: 205)).

[43] Allegories will, accordingly, be seen, not as extensive mental mappings lurking below the connected metaphorical expressions in a text, but just as series of individual similarities, connected to each other via the world based connectedness of things in the fields of experience referred to in "the source domain." The journey in LIFE IS A JOURNEY is not something mental, but the actual connectedness of things – roads, landscapes, cars etc. – learned about during our upbringing and given (literal) labels in our language.

distinction between certain areas in our experience of the world, for instance the basic physical world alluded to in the example with the cat and the mat, and different, more or less non-tangible phenomenon. There are, of course, non-physical phenomena in the world, and there are lots of them – for instance, all kinds of thoughts and all kinds of social institutions. But according to the Communication Theorists they have nothing to do with non-translatable, metaphorical mappings. All metaphors – also, for instance, our metaphor "Juliet is the sun" and some of the Cognitive Semanticists favoured metaphors like VALUE ORIENTATIONS ARE SPACES, LIFE IS A JOURNEY and TIME IS MONEY – are, according to the Communication Theorists, not creative devices, for there are for the Communication Theorist no such creative devices, but simply devices referring to a text and communication independent world – that is part of the realistic presuppositions in this paradigm – and are as a world revealed through paraphrases literary true of it.

This dismissal of the concept of the creative metaphor brings the Communicative Theorists close to the classical theory of metaphor from Aristotle and Quintilian, according to which metaphors are, as we have seen, purely ornamental: according to the Communicative Theorists, metaphors and other sorts of tropes add nothing to our conception of the world. It gives us nothing to grasp what cannot be grasped through literal language. Juliet is still Juliet, the sun is still the sun, and Romeos feelings towards Juliet are still the feelings of Romeo as revealed by the metaphor *independently of the metaphor used, and in principle totally describable in non-metaphorical terms.*

Therefore, we need the paraphrase as a necessary feature of our conception of metaphor – together with the marker and the mechanism.

It is difficult not to find the Communication Theorists arguments against the Cognitive Semanticists compelling. Therefore, we have to adopt this tripartite distinction between marker, mechanism and paraphrase in metaphor.

But, haven't we thrown the baby out with the bathwater concerning the creativity of metaphor?

Actually, not everything is said about the Communication Theorists' conception of the paraphrase. The paraphrase is considered as a truth about the situation paraphrased. But that *does not exclude the possibility of other true paraphrases.* And that is, according to the Communication Theorists, the real – but also the only – secret, if there is any, about the talk about the creativity of the metaphor: Metaphor and other tropes allows us access to not just one, but a series of – and, supposedly, for some tropes in principle indefinitely many – literal interpretations. Or, as we will say, based on the fact that tropes are pragmatic and not semantic phenomena: In tropes, the speaker or author offers his audience a variety of inferential opportunities based on what is (faulty or not correctly) said. As with the other literary parameters, the metaphor, then, reveals itself as a *loose*[44] or *open*[45] implicature.

[44] Cf. Sperber & Wilson (1983: 234–235).

This means that the only, but important, thing that separates the metaphorical expression from the literal paraphrase is, according to the Communication Theorists, the amount of paraphrases allowed in the communicative exchange. There are no alternative types of cognition and no new entities in the world to be perceived by using metaphors. The *understanding* of the metaphor is, so far, quite literal.

The fact that you, according to the Communication Theorists, can allow in principle indefinitely many interpretations, does not mean that anything can be a paraphrase as, for instance, Donald Davidson has faultily suggested.[46] Of course the marker has, in the midst of its defectiveness, set a framework for what can be a metaphorical interpretation and what cannot. Naturally, "Juliet is the sun" cannot be interpreted as a request to pay tax. Here, the interpretation opportunities are curtailed by the fact that the metaphorical expression lends some of its semantic content to the possible set of paraphrases. It is the same as saying that paraphrases are found among the restricted set of expressions that refer to a similarity between the two things the metaphorical expression refers to. Here, it is obviously the creative responsibility of the author to determine the guidelines for the metaphorical interpretation, while it is the responsibility of the hearer or reader to find the inferences which are the more striking ones among the many possible paraphrases.[47]

We have seen that the way the repetition metaphor represents is decidedly different from the repetition the literal expression carries with it: While the repetition contained in the literal expression is *internal to language*, the repetition in metaphor and other tropes is external to language in the sense that the metaphor is a prompt to find a similarity between two or more things *in the world.* That means: In metaphor, the literalness degrades into something which equates baptizing with simple use, and that is precisely the claim made by the Communicative Theorists. Therefore, the metaphor looks like a predicate a class inclusion[48], and yet not: Here, we have a repetition, but there is no requirement that the repetition must be identical to the thing repeated as in

[45] Searle states that metaphors, in this context, are not creative helping us to see things we hitherto could not have seen but open ended, allowing several paraphrases (Searle 1979a: 115).

[46] Davidson (1978). Although Davidson has a completely different philosophical basis than the adherents of the cognitive metaphor theory, his criticism is in part based on the same argument as the Cognitive semanticists, namely that the boundary between literal and metaphorical meaning is more or less non-existent. He can, therefore, be met with the same criticism as the Cognitive semanticists.

[47] It is important to understand that metaphor and other tropes allow the hearer or reader to be more creative than the speaker or author. The speaker or author can lay eggs in the basket of interpretations of the metaphor which he did not even realize he has laid there but which are there for the receiver to enjoy.

[48] Cf. Glucksberg (2001) who has exploited the concept of metaphor along these lines.

literal talk. It suffices that it is similar. The metaphor "My love is a rose" does not say that my beloved is a rose; instead it says: "Go and look at some rose and see what features in the rose you can reuse for describing your beloved" – but, this praxis of finding similarities has nothing to do with the semantics of the metaphorical expression. It is a purely pragmatic matter.

If we scrutinize the matter a little bit more closely, we will find that choosing a metaphor is, actually, the same as choosing a higher level of abstraction. Romeo can describe Juliet in many ways: she is warm, she is sensitive, she is lovely, she is wonderful, she is life-giving, she is unattainable, but Romeo can also simply say that Juliet is the sun. By that Romeo gives a similar characterization of her, but in a much more abstract and at the same time looser sense: He can move in many possible directions. Nevertheless, it is the similarity between the literal and the metaphorical depiction that is central here. In this sense we find the metaphor in the field of text coherence: Metaphors create coherence in a text, but not in the same way as the literal expression. They do it in a more approximate manner – via similarities in the world.

So if we are to find a cognitive creativity in metaphor, it must be this: Metaphor is an *economic package full of possible paraphrases* a package the readers could open and amuse themselves with.[49]

But, here, we also find the aesthetic function of metaphor: It is always fascinating to open packages, especially if they present themselves with an evasive and – precisely for that reason – challenging content. In this, tropicity resembles figurativity: they both stimulate creativity and create human joy.

As we have already seen, tropicity involves other tropes than just metaphors. Among other things, they also involve metonymy and synecdoche. Now, if you examine these two other tropes, an interesting thing shows up: The field of tropes reveals itself, in fact, to be a deeply seated, relatively simple field related to the ground structure of perceptual experience, actually, the structure we have already dealt with in the section about figurativity.

Let us take a look at the following figure:

[49] Here, you could say that metaphor meets literal talk two times when a metaphor is created: the first time is (a) when you are using literal words in an etiolated form to create a marker for the metaphor, and the second time is (b) when you are using literal words in a non-etiolated form to create paraphrases.
It is important to emphasize that, if we still want to call a metaphor a metaphor, we must at least be able to produce more than one paraphrase. Sometimes we can't. But, that is, normally, because the metaphor has been killed, as with idioms like "You are pulling my leg", "Shall we call it a day" and "I am biting the bullet." That metaphors are brought to death by fixating their meaning does not mean that we cannot revitalize them. But it usually requires special contexts to re-open them as metaphors – contexts of type (a) above.



Fig. 7: Relations between two figures on a ground

As you can see, fig. 7 looks like fig. 1 where we found an illustration of a repetition of a linguistic expression. In fig. 1 we found that we could always identify two relations, namely (a) *configurativity* ("C" in fig. 7), the overall presence of several expressions, and (b) *comparability* (in terms of a possibility of similarity or difference between the two figures; "≈" in fig. 7). But now the same two relations have, actually, shown up again in connection with the tropes, namely in the form of figures in the world, figures the linguistic expressions can refer to. This is, exactly, the starting point for formation of tropes generally: Two figures A and B are located in a field of perception. That allows either to make inquiries about (i) the degree to which A and B are similar, or to ask for (ii) the spatial, temporal, colored etc. relation A and B form with each other or with the overall form.[50]

Together with this simple understanding of the relationship in Fig. 7, a crucial juxtaposition of metaphor and metonymy/synecdoche is pinpointed which has not in the same way – and not with the same radicalism – been realized within the rhetorical tradition from Aristotle to Quintilian. Now, with our new insight, we can see every trope as both a metaphor and a metonymy/synecdoche. However, it is not always possible to *see* that it is so. Here, it

[50] The relation in (ii) is so far the same metaphysical relation as a relation reflected in a proposition, namely that we will always be able to choose between portraying the referent of the proposition as a relation from part to whole, such as happens in all so-called "to be"-constructions – "The mailbox is red", "There are pears on the tree this year" – or either from part to part in a configuration or from part to configuration or configuration to part as it occurs in all so-called "to have"-construction – "Trees have finally produced pears this year." These grounding relations and the causal matrix they are embedded in are described by me in Widell (1996).

must further be required that the repetition that takes place of A in B, appears as sufficiently perceptually salient – i.e. perceptual in such a way that B can be seen as a sufficiently specific context for A.

Let me explain what this means.

In many tropical expressions it is difficult to read both tropes. It is, for example, not easy to see the metonymy in the abovementioned metaphor from Aristotle "The lion Achilles" and the metaphor in the metonymies "Can we eat a can of mackerel and tomato sauce today?" or "The whole house was turned upside-down." It is not because the ability to read both parts is not present, but rather that the configuration that constitutes the backdrop of tropical formation cannot form a sufficiently accurate picture of the context as we find them in the corresponding metonymies of the configurations. That does not mean it is impossible for us to do so. We can force them to appear. For instance, we can, for a decoding of the trope "The fog comes on little cat feet" (Carl Sandburg 1916), always ask what similarity "fog" can establish with some figure which could be part of the configuration referred to by the rest of the sentence. Or to take an example previously used: "the dense crimson hue of life" (Christensen 2004 (1991): 3). Here you, for an understanding of the trope, can place the referent of "dense crimson hue" both in a configuration relation to the rest of the sentence, and in a similarity relation to some figure that could enter into the configuration that the rest of the sentence refers to.

With this explanation of the relationship between metaphor and metonymy/synecdoche, and with the elucidation of the difficulties which usually means that we cannot see both the metaphor and the metonymy/synecdoche in a repetition, we, now, cannot only say that the metaphor is more multifarious than metonymy and in that sense rightly bears the name of the "master trope". We can also explain it: Metonymy/synecdoche requires a concrete anchoring of repetition as context. In case you cannot find it for the metaphor, you cannot find the corresponding metonymy/synecdoche either.

6 Fictionality

By fictionality as a feature of a literary text we will understand the different kinds of pretended non-truths in the text, intended by the author and signalized pragmatically or semantically for an audience as so intended by him – where the pretence is a repetition or miming of other texts living up to the standards of the Gricean maxims.

Figurativity, literal meaning, and tropes all build, as we have seen, on something very simple, namely *repetitions of figures*: While figurativity in written texts consists of repetitions of letters, letter groups, and other expressions, literal meaning consists of repetitions of situations – that is, repetition in use situations of what has been learnt in baptizing situations – and tropes

in repeating one object (i.e. Juliet) "through" another object (i.e. the sun) (on the basis of common features).

As we will see, the two last parameters, fictionality and literary realism, also build upon repetition. But, instead of attending to mostly repetitions of sentence parts or sentences, as in figurativity and tropicity, we will here predominantly attend to repetitions of whole texts (or at least more extensive text parts).

It is a widespread opinion that fictionality refers to something imagined or to a world different from this world, called a merely possible world.[51] It is, however, an unfortunate way of characterizing fictionality. The reason why is that you cannot square it with the conditions of communication: if you want to get your message through to someone you are communicating with, then you have to operate via instances that are observable by you and the persons you are addressing: *inner states must have outward criteria*.[52] Otherwise they cannot exist from a communicative point of view.[53] That is, fictionality is – as one normally uses the concept – neither a concept linked to the imagination (if you understand it as a kind of inner movie), nor a semantic concept. It does not consist of swapping from reference to object in this world to objects in an imagined or fictional world different from the actual world as it is falsely envisaged from this semantic understanding of the concept.

But how should we understand fictionality, then?

When we speak, what we say may be true or false, and when we are talking falsely, we can do it in several ways. We can do it because we are ignorant. We can do it because we want to lie, perhaps by getting some benefit from letting someone believe it. Or we can say or write something untrue because we want to create fictionality, a piece of fictional prose. In creating fictionality we create a falsehood, but also something that is not a lie. We hide nothing. Quite the contrary: If we want to create fictionality, we have to show our intention – usually because we want a particular purpose accommodated with what we are saying, or, for short, because we have the meta-intention that our intention to say something false is apparent. It is important to note that this *reflective element in fictionality* always seems to be included in the creation of fictionality. In that respect, the question of whether a piece of text is literal or

[51] Lewis (1978).

[52] This is a hidden citation from Wittgenstein (2001 (1951): §580).

[53] Wittgenstein (2001 (1951): §293). In this paragraph, Wittgenstein is presenting us for an analogy from which we can draw the appropriate conclusions. He asks us to imagine a situation where we all have a box in front of us in which only the owners of the respective boxes can see into his own box. When suddenly a person rises up and points into his box and says "beetle" what has he, then, communicated to all of us? The answer is of course *nothing* because there are no outward criteria for what he has pointed at. And that will be the same for inner experiences, mental images, private thinking and things like that. They do not exist independently of their public manifestations in perception and action.

fictional is totally up to the author. Exactly as it is when we are lying. Whether what is said is true or not is a matter of investigation, and here we are all participants. Not when we lie. And the same goes for fictionality: if you deliberately want to suspend the question of the truth of what you are saying, it is totally up to you to do it.[54]

This can also be expressed by saying that fictionality is not so much a feature of the content of what is said or written, as it is a feature of the speaking and writing of it. You cannot always just by looking at what someone says or writes – the wording of what he is saying or writing – tell whether it is a piece of fictionality or not. In that respect fictionality is *not a matter of syntax or semantics, but exclusively a matter of pragmatics*. You have to consult the intention of the author (as it is revealed to you by the author) in order to know whether what you are reading, is fictional or not.[55]

Most adherents of the pragmatic approach characterize fictionality in the following way: When an author writes something fictional, e.g. a novel or a short story, he is engaged in *letting it be clear for the reader that he is just pretending to say or write what he is saying or writing*. Fictionality is, then, for the pragmatically oriented analyst considered to be an *ad hoc signalized pretended reference and truth*.[56] Here "pretence" means that the author, as to the content, is doing exactly the same thing as he would have done if he actually referred and asserted something true, and that the only difference is that while reference and truth play a decisive role in a non-fictional text, this role is suspended in the corresponding fictional text. Or as the English 18th century poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge[57] has formulated it: fictionality is actually a

[54] A common objection to this viewpoint is that there are a lot of examples where a text has been considered fictional by some and non-fictional and, actually, true for others. In this context many refers to the Bible as originally considered to be a book of telling the truth about how the world was created and ruled, but now mostly taken as a fictional work (or at least a book which requires a symbolic reading).
However, this is not a counterexample to the view that fictionality is up to the writer to decide. The Bible is not a fictional work exactly because it has never been intended to be a fictional work. But, of course, you can always read the Bible *as if* it were a fictional work.

[55] Perhaps it should be pinpointed that this is *not* a case of *the intentional fallacy* (Wimsatt & Beardsley 1954). It has nothing to do with the intentions concerning the content of what is said. It has only to do with the intention to communicate the ontological status of what is said, namely that it is a piece of fictionality.

[56] Cf. Searle (1974–1975), Currie (1990), Walton (1990), Lamarque & Olsen (1994). The signalizing part of fictionality is put into parenthesis because it is normally not mentioned by adherents of the pragmatic approach – only implied. It is important, though, to emphasize – as, for instance, Searle does – that pretence cannot operate in a context consisting of hidden motives. If we detect such motives, we do not have fiction. We just have plain dissimulation.

[57] Coleridge (1817: 6). Coleridge speaks in this connection about "poetic belief".

"suspension of disbelief". This must not be misconceived, though, as a wish from the author that the reader in each and every respect should react on what he is reading, as if the text was not fictional.[58] This will not create fictionality. It will at most amount to a seduction of the reader. When dealing with fictionality, the reader should all the time have the opportunity to maintain meta-awareness about the fact that what he is reading is not something that is true, but something which at most could be true.

In that sense a fictional text participates, as we have already mentioned, in a *hollow, etiolated* or *parasitic* form of communication.[59] Relating it to the Gricean maxims, fictionality is defined by flouting the maxim of truthfulness, and thereby also the maxims of informativeness and relevance – but, important to notice, not correctness: the words used in fictional speech acts retain their usual meaning.[60]

Searle has – as we have seen – defined fictionality as a *non-deceptive* form of pretended reference and truth. But how does the author create the message: "What I say to you is just pretence (and not just meaningless rubbish)"? Here, Currie (1985), for instance, defines fictionality – along this kind of explicit indication – as a special kind of illocutionary act. But this seems a bad idea – as Currie himself later realizes (Currie 1990) – because this doubles up the number of types of illocutionary acts, so that for each and every literal illocutionary act there has to be a corresponding illocutionary act of fictionality. And that sounds implausible. Here, Searle defines the device thus: "Now, what makes fiction possible, I suggest, is a set of extra-linguistic, non-semantic conventions that break the connection between words and the world [...]" (Searle 1974–1975: 66). They are, as Searle wants to call them, "horizontal conventions" (Searle 1974–1975: 66). I think this characterization is wrong: sets of extra-linguistic, non-semantic conventions do not occur out of the blue. They stem from something simpler. The question is, however, how they are established.

[58] Hearing or reading fiction is hearing or reading it as in discord with the modified Gricean maxims; nevertheless it is not forbidden to invest your feelings and emotions in what we are hearing or reading. And it is, actually, rather difficult to resist this investment.
Not being able to resist investing our feelings and emotions in fictionality is a psychological feature which presumably has at least a part of its psychological explanation in the fact that we are thereby given the opportunity to practice *empathic preferences* for our fellow men, which probably again – in the light of evolutionary theory – could be seen as essential to the survival of the human race as a social species.

[59] Cf. Austin (1962:51).

[60] The fictional text can, of course, be influenced by other literary parameters – for instance figurativity – which more or less can corrupt the meaningfulness of the text.

Since they, according to Searle, are conventions, they must have been established as conventions. But, how is it possible to establish a convention like the one Searle is talking about?

Actually, Searle is telling us very little about it. Searle calls the conventions in question "extra-linguistic" and "non-semantic". And, indeed, they must be located outside the pretended speech acts – and in that sense they must be extra-linguistic and non-semantic.

But can they be conventions at all? Of course, you can always create conventions supporting language and institutions – also relating to fiction: when it is indicated at the front page of the book you hold in your hand that it is a novel or a collection of fairy tales, you are, for the interpretation of this indication, depending upon a convention governing the words "novel" and "fairy tale". The words are shorthand versions of the assertions "The book in your hand is a novel" and "The book in your hand is a fairy tale collection" together with implications indicating that it is, therefore, fictional texts. And that is OK.[61] But, such paratextual indications, as Genette calls them[62], are often not present in situations where we make judgments about the fictionality of a text. So what are we doing in these situations? Do we have a convention after all, but a different kind of convention?

I do not think so. I think that we have and, actually, must have to define fictionality/intentions *without* conventions. What you hear from the author is not acceptable for you as a true description. On the other hand you cannot accept it as a lie. There are too many features in the context to indicate that it could be a lie either or – to put it in other words – it seems too be blatantly irrelevant as a lie.

Therefore – and that is, in my opinion, the true specification of the marker of fictionality – a marker of fictionality is not a convention, and not just a violation of the maxim of truthfulness, because it is not a lie, but rather a potential candidate for being just *an intentional violation of the Gricean maxim of relevance.*[63]

That is in a way a surprising result, because fictionality has almost exclusively been associated with the Gricean maxim of truthfulness. But, here we must be careful to distinguish between the marker and the content (corresponding to the "marker" and the "mechanism" of the metaphor): It's the marker which is decisive for the definition of fictionality while there are, actually, *no restrictions on the pretended content* – at least, if you do not want to

[61] The same goes for conventions integrated into the fictional text as, for example, standard phrases as "Once upon a time [...]." Such standard phrases must not be taken to be constitutive of fictionality.

[62] Cf. Grice (1997).

[63] That is why fictional speech acts can, in principle, all be held true by an author, and still be fictional speech acts. The non-true character of speech acts in fictional literature is only an indication of the irrelevance of the text. It is not a constitutive element of it.

restrict the content to just narrative fictionality, but want to recognize it for what it is, namely just a kind of fictionality. You can also pretend to perform orders, promises, announcements, exclamations etc. Here, you are not pretending to tell the truth. But the acts are, of course, still fictional. They are fictional orders, fictional promises, fictional announcements, fictional exclamations etc. It would be bizarre *not* to call them that.

This means that fiction is a much more comprehensive category than a category just comprising narrative fictionality. Fictionality also includes what is going on in theatres and movies: here, we find fictionality just as well as in what we read when we are reading narrative fictionality. The only difference is that we, here, call the fictionality *dramatic* instead of narrative.

However, in theatres and cinemas we can see some interesting things taking place on stage not so easily spotted in written literature: Here, we find that not all acts are speech acts as is the case in a book. Some of them, namely the lines, are what the characters say to each other; but others are not. For example, sitting in a sofa or mixing a drink. But they are fictional acts all the same. They are expressions of the fact that the actors are pretending to *be* the characters of the play. In a play *everything* is pretended – even the stage setting.

But, it is here, I think, we shall find the core element in a proper definition of fiction. *Fiction is pretended being, not just pretended saying.* This should be understood in its most general form. Pretended being is not just confined to non-true propositions in a book. It is not just confined to literature, and to what is going on in theatres and cinemas. It is an essential ingredient in social games in general. What happens in theatres, cinemas and books is kindred to what is going on in nursery rooms or among animals at play. Here, we find a common effort to establish a fragile social, not yet conventional, bond between individuals. It is here we shall find the common Gricean framework, within which the author or the actor has the possibility to create, sovereignly, all the fictional acts and modes of being they want. Text fiction is just a smaller part of this larger concept of fictionality.

Let me, then, in the light of these considerations on dramatic fictionality, try to spell out what fictionality of texts – according to my opinion – consists of. Instead of starting with semantics, we will now start our explanation with pragmatics[64] or, to be more precise, with *the pragmatics of cheating.* My strat-

[64] Richard Walsh (2005) has tried to ground fictionality pragmatically, as we are trying to do it. Unfortunately, he thinks that he can do it without taking into account the meaning concept operative in Grice's theory of implicature. Following Sperber & Wilson he tries to base the concept of implicature on only one maxim, the maxim of relevance. Briefly put, he is trying to skip the Gricean maxims of truthfulness and correctness as independent maxims carrying steady meaning contents. That is a strongly counterintuitive case of inflationism: of course, we can meet borderline cases. But we cannot doubt that "Juliet is the sun" represents a violation against the meaning rules of language (cf. note 3).

egy will be to establish a sequence of pretending scenarios beginning with the most primitive form, cheating, and ending up with the most sophisticated form, text fictionality: (1) The most primitive pre-form of text fictionality is *cheating as we find it among higher animals*, for instance in connection with hunting: Here, the prey is trying to cheat the predator by escape moves: the preys actions are not what they seem to be. This forms the basis for building (2) forms of "cheating" which are framed in double Gricean intentions of communicating that this "cheating" is a "cheating"; generally, such ad hoc frames constitutes *forms of non-deceptive pretending*. (3) On the basis of these kinds of double intentions more *conventional sets of markers are, gradually, created* as, for instance, a conventional marker for attending a play in the form of a certain building equipped with a stage and seats for the audience: the building with all its facilities simply counts as *a non-deceptive place for performing non-deceptive pretended acts*. (4) Under the scope of such markers, the whole stage setting and everything the actors are doing, including their lines, are by the author, the actors, and the audience, understood as pretended actions under instruction from the author; you could say, as Plato once did, that *the author through his instructions to the actors are using them as a means of his addressing the audience with their pretended actions*. (5) Included in the play we could now have a situation where one of the players is reading aloud from a book; let us say he is reading aloud from the telephone book; then we have *a situation where an actor standing before the audience is pretending (before the audience) to tell a story to the by-standing characters in the play*. (6) But, this situation can, again, lead to the following situation: let us say that the actor is, instead, reading a fairy tale, e.g. the fairy tale *The Princess on the Pea* by Hans Christian Andersen (cf. Andersen 1844); then he is, now, pretending (before the audience) that he is pretending (before the characters in the play)

7

read from the telefone book

Another attempt at grounding fictionality pragmatically is Genette (1993 (1991): 30–53) who tries to analyse fictionality in terms of indirect speech acts. This is unfortunate. Even if we do not see a doubling of illocutionary speech acts as with Currie (1985), we have a major problem because we are violating the concept of an indirect speech act: Indirect speech acts always have a direct illocutionary act complying with the modified Gricean maxims. Here, we do not have a situation like this: The direct speech act cannot be a direct speech act in the Searlean sense because it is etiolated as such an act already from the start. It is, so to speak, born as a fictional act.

Furthermore, even if this requirement is met, it presupposes that fictionality is a demand on each and every speech act all through the fictional text. But that sounds counterintuitive. The marker for fictionality is, normally, a marker set only once for a given text which is – in the vast majority of the cases – the text as a whole. Sometimes, it can, of course, take a while before the reader realizes that a given text is fictional. But if the text is once identified as fictional by its expressions, it is normal – as a rule of thumb – not to change opinion about the fictionality of the text. And if you do, you will probably not call what you are exposed to a text but, rather, a *collage* of texts, a fictional text and a literal text.

to read this fairy tale. (7) Let us, now, say that the actor has been hired to entertain an audience in an evening arrangement at a public library reading aloud the same story he was reciting onstage, but now from a podium; then, his fellow actors have disappeared, but we still have *a situation where an actor pretends to tell a story – now directly to the audience*. But exactly this last situation is, I think, the secret key to the understanding of text fictionality. For even if we, in this situation, have two audiences fused together, which admittedly is a major transformation, there is nevertheless still a clear separation between the actual author and the actor telling the story before the audience. (7) And *if the actor is the author himself reading his own text* – let us say it is the fairy tale author Hans Christian Andersen reading his fairy tale "The Princess on the Pea" before an audience of children sitting around him – *we have, actually a situation, where the author is reading a piece of literary fictionality before his audience*. (8) Now, this piece of fiction can, easily, transform itself to a book. That will be the case *when the author – e.g. Hans Christian Andersen – instead of telling the story to an audience of listeners, prefers to present it in written form to an audience of readers*. Notice, that the distinction between author and actor from the stage is still preserved in the book: what has happened is just that the distinction has turned into a distinction between an author writing the text and a narrator pretending to read the text for the audience.[65] (9) This distinction can, now, be *semantically conventionalized as it has happened with a marker as "novel" on the front page of a novel or the marker "Once upon a time [...]" or "And they lived happily hereafter" as "internal" markers in a fairy tale*. Actually, throughout history a lot of more or less conspicuous expressions have gradually evolved, characterizing the different styles in narrative fiction, and in fictionality generally, expressions which, in addition to their functioning inside the fictional text, also point to the text as more or less unmistakably marked piece of fictionality.[66]

[65] Perhaps it sounds strange to many to consider the relationship between author and narrator in a fictional narrative text as being parallel to the relationship between author and actor in a dramatic text. It perhaps makes sense – you could interpose – to say of a narrator reading his own text that he is an author instructing himself as narrator. But does it make sense when the author is addressing his audience as a writer?

I think so. Of course, he is no longer instructing himself as a narrator in the case of a fictional narrative text. But there is still left the discrepancy between the situation of writing the work as an author and the situation of presenting the work to the audience when it is finished. Here, the parallel to the dramatic text is preserved: when addressing the actors, the person writing the dramatic text is exposing the same discrepancy between his role as a writer and his role as a person presenting the text.

[66] It is important to emphasize that these styles *do not constitute fictionality*. The fictional form may facilitate these styles. And they can be important text features to be studied in their own right. They do not, however, define fictionality. Unfor-

But why do we have fictionality at all? What is fictionality for? Of course, it is mainly done for the aesthetic fun and pleasure of it, and, therefore, actually not done for anything special. That applies to the level of personal experience, and this is a reason we in a certain sense cannot ask behind this experience, as we have seen. But that does not mean that we cannot ask for a more objective, biological reason. Since fictionality is connected to social play, it offers – like play – opportunities to engage in human practice without being exposed to the restraints of real action. Truth is suspended, and with that the usual dangers and risks of life. This makes fictionality a perfect place for rehearsal, for training and for educating your skills. And this represents, undoubtedly, an evolutionary gain: the time used for education of your skills represents an enhancement of the adaptability in a complex environment of the species you belong to. And fiction, definitely, furthers this.

7 (Degree of) realism

By (degree of) realism as a feature of fictionality in texts we will understand to what extend they are similar to non-fictive texts – that is texts living up to the standards of the Gricean maxims.

It is well known that a fictional work can be subjected to thematic, symbolic or moral interpretation. *The Ugly Duckling*, for instance, is first and foremost a fictional story and a story loaded with tropes, especially anthropomorphisms; but it is also a story calling for a thematic or symbolic interpretation: *The Ugly Duckling*, is, really, we have learned, about how a born genius, in spite all odds, is bound to realize his potential as a genius (cf. note 3). It is, however, important to remember that such thematic or symbolic interpretations have nothing to do with the fictionality of the story. The question of *the thematic or symbolic meaning* of a fictional story is really a question *added* to the question of fiction, and belongs therefore to the area of tropicity: The story serves qua story as a marker of a trope, here a symbol or an allegory, calling for a paraphrase. Through the paraphrase the story is turning itself to a statement about reality. You could call this aspect of fictional literature an aspect of realism. But since this paraphrase is not a proper part of the fictional text it is a little bit misleading to associate this kind of realism with fictionality. And, usually, you do not talk about realism here.

The real question of realism is found, not in the interpretation of the text, but in the very constitution of the fictional text as realistic. To this question we will now turn.

tunately, many researchers have claimed that, partly following the claims of the Russian formalists.

But before we do that, we first have to separate this kind of realism – we will call it *literary realism*[67] – from another concept of realism that we will call *philosophical realism*. Philosophical realism is the kind of realism we have talked about all along in the discussion above. It is simply the doctrine saying that the existence of the thing referred to is not created by the act of referring, but presupposed by it.

Since fictionality is pretence, literary realism cannot be founded on this concept. It must be coined as a separate concept.

But, why do we normally have a very strong feeling that certain fictional texts seem more realistic – more true to reality – than certain other texts? A question like that, of course, calls for an answer.[68]

To answer the question we should perhaps take a closer look at our concept of fictionality. As we have seen, fiction takes its point of departure in

[67] We should – perhaps more appropriate – have called literary realism *fictional realism*, because of its attachment exclusively to the parameter of fictionality. Then we will be able term-wise to distinguish between realism in texts – literary realism – and realism on stage – dramatic realism, both hyponyms of fictional realism. I choose, however, in this article to use the more common term literary realism.

[68] It should be mentioned that we, in fictional literature, can meet not just pretended reference and truth and symbolic truth, but also, of course, real – that is: philosophical – reference and truth. When in *Madame Bovary* (Flaubert 1858) the narrator is talking about the city of Rouen and the village Yonville-l'A'bbaye we suppose it is the real city of Rouen and the real village of Yonville-l'A'bbaye he is talking about and not just fictional localities. And when we in the beginning of the second part of the novel read the extensive description of the town of Yonville-l'A'bbaye we presume that it is a fairly accurate description. Actually, most of the readers do not know, and live happily with that. They are not interested in historical or topological details of this region of France, and read it just as if it were a piece of fictionality (cf. note 60). If what we read is, in fact, true of the town of Yonville-l'A'bbaye, then it is reasonable to say that the fictional text is flavoured with reality and in that – philosophical – sense realistic (but irrelevant in relation to the aesthetic appraisal); and, in general, it is reasonable to say that the more a piece of literary prose refers to real places, real times and real things and persons, the more philosophical, but not necessarily literally realistic, it is. In that sense Winston Churchill's autobiography *My Early Life* (Churchill 1874–1904) could be said to be more realistic than Sir Walter Scott's historical novel *Ivanhoe* (Scott 1906 (1819)).
Since it is not my concern to contribute to genre theory and to the prototypical concept of fictionality (as to prototypicality, cf. note 3) I will not go further into this question here. Likewise, I will not go into the related question of how many non-fictional elements we shall pass into a text and still call it fictional. Let me just say this: if segments of a mixed text is not true, then these parts have to be *signalized* as not true by the author. Otherwise they are not fictional. If the reader is deprived the means to evaluate whether a text is fictional or not, but the author knows they are not true, then, concerning these parts, the text is just a heap of lies. And if he is mocking in his signalizing or reluctant to signalize that he is doing it, he is just cheating.

feinting, and in feinting – as in the more evolved form: pretence – nothing is what it seems to be. But the thing that seems and the thing it is a seeming of are not totally disconnected. There is a *likeness* or *similarity* between what is feinted or pretended and the feinting or pretending of it. That's why Plato and Aristotle talk about fictionality as a sort of mimicry, as *mimesis*.

We have intentionally underplayed this mimicry element until now, because of its minor role in the definition of the concept of fictionality. For, although it is always present in fictionality, it is a relatively independent feature. It comes in degrees. But it is this we will identify with literary realism. In literary realism we always ask questions like: how true is the pretence to life, how true is it to reality?

To clarify, more precisely, how this concept of literary realism evolves in human interaction and communication, it could be useful to take another look at our animals from last section. In our hunting example from earlier there isn't any understanding between the hunted and the hunter about what the hunted is doing. If there were, the hunted would never escape its predator. But this means that there in feinting isn't any basis to build mimicry upon. To build a platform for mimicry, we must have an agreement among the participants about what to compare. This can, actually, be the case, among some higher animals, for instance among young monkeys nipping each other during play.[69] Here, we find a mutual understanding and confidence between the two animals that *the nip is not a bite*. That is: Here we have a point of departure for comparing two things attentively: the nip and the bite.

That is, actually, the birth of the concept of literary realism and any other form of fictitious realism: A situation of mimicry has evolved from a situation of a mere feinting.

The rest of the story of literary realism and fictitious realism in general is just the story of how we can transform this fragile distance between the factual and the counterfactual – the distance from the nip to the bite in the same situation – to a distance between on the one hand a more freestanding etiolated example of a bite, and on the other hand bites in general. If we can imagine this transformation, we then have a backdrop for comparison which covers all fictional props and acts, including those we find on stage in theatres, in movies, and in books, and we have our *measure of the degree of realism*. We can now say that *the more a fictional unit A – from a unit in a game among animals to a unit on the stage in a theatre or in a book – is similar to a unit outside the fictional situation B, known independently of the fictional unit A, the more realism we find in A with respect to B*. That is, if we watch two persons onstage sitting on a sofa engaged in an exchange of words, this situation becomes more realistic, the more it resembles a (kind of) situation outside the theatre where two people are engaged in a similar exchange of words.

[69] This example I have borrowed from Bateson (1972 (1955): 179).

Concerning this similarity relation, it is important to see that it has nothing to do with reference. The realism here is not philosophical realism. It is fictitious realism: the situation on stage does not refer to a (kind of) situation outside the theatre. It is a relation of comparing between the two situations – like in painting. In painting a picture states nothing about what it depicts. It is just more or less similar to what it depicts.[70] The same is the case with a stage play or a novel. As to the stage setting and all the props in a play, we have a sort of picture or sculpture. Just as Leonardo da Vinci's picture of Mona Lisa – irrespectively of whether it refers to Mona Lisa or not is a more or less realistic – of a young lady, so the stage setting in *A Doll's House* by Henrik Ibsen from 1879 – as it is presented to the audience – forms part of a more or less realistic example of a house. The same goes for Nora's leaving the house at the end of the play. Here again, we have just another example of a person leaving a house behind. And likewise when Nora says to Torvald: "As I am now, I am no wife for you". These words, in their context, again form a more or less realistic example of a sentence, a sentence we as well can meet in a real life context.

When you are attending a play sitting in a theatre, the furniture on stage is a part of the pretended setting on stage, and that they are more or less realistic examples of furniture, in the sense that they can look more or less like real furniture, which we can meet in almost every home. The same is true for the lines in a play. They are more or less realistic copies of speech acts from real life, and the more realistic they are, the more adequately embedded in the various situations on stage they are, in accordance with the Gricean maxims. When Nora, in act 2 of *A Doll's House*, says to Mrs. Linde: "Let us sit down here on the sofa", then Nora is referring to a (more or less reliable) sofa on stage. So besides the hollow use of speech acts on stage, there is a genuine use of them to connect to things and characters on stage contributing to the realism of the play. We can say that, besides miming situations outside theatre, the speech acts performed on stage have an *internal reference* to all that can be seen on stage by actors and audience (things referred to without having a prop on stage are, however, only referents of pretended referring acts).

All this seems to change when we look at novels or other literary texts not playing a part in a play. Of course, we have parallels to what is happening on stage. What is true for a line on stage is, certainly, also true for a sentence delivered in a novel, a short story or a fairy tale. When Flaubert "paints" his portrait of Emma in *Madame Bovary*, we have the same opportunity to evaluate his work concerning its degree of realism. But if we ask what the elements

[70] A picture may, of course, be used for referential purposes. I can, for instance, show a person a picture and say: "This is a portrait of Hans Christian Andersen." Then this person knows what the famous fairy tale writer looks like. But, this reference is not due to the picture. It is due to my decision to let the picture be a part of my pointing gesture.

of the comparison are, we nevertheless get embarrassed. In the theatre, we have the setting which we can be put up against a situation in real life. And we have their internal reference to the props and persons on stage, securing the coherence of the performances there. But we don't seem to have anything like that in a text. Here, all seems to shrink – the props on stage, the actors. All these kinds of referents seem to disappear.

We still have, though, an element of comparison: we still have the text. In *Madame Bovary* we can still ask what the text looks like in the real world. Perhaps the answer looks a little bit odd since it cannot have anything to do with what the text is about, because it is fiction: it is about nothing.

However, we still have an answer: We still have *other speech acts*. Here, we have something we can compare the speech acts in the book with. But that is exactly our situation: fictional realism is the degree to which a sequence of speech acts constituting a text is similar, or resembles, other sequences of speech acts constituting other texts. In Madame Bovary there are no sofas, chairs, walls, etc. to bring in comparison relationship with real sofas, chairs, walls in the world, and to secure the coherence of what is going on internally. Yet, we can still pretend to write a recipe in a book; namely, by miming a real recipe, and we can still pretend to write a diary; namely, by miming a real diary. And we can still pretend to write a sermon; namely, by miming a real sermon, and so on. That is, it is entirely in miming of speech acts from other texts that we find literary realism.

Mimicry in fictional texts must not, though, be thought of as sheer copying. It is a highly varied repetition. What is mimed is neither the exact wording of other sentences, nor the content of the speech acts connected to them, but, rather, the way the speech acts are put together in a more circumstantial fashion. It is the *style* and *the general circumstances of producing the speech act sequences in a text*. A realistic text or text part is, actually, a kind of *pastiche* over other texts: when reading *Madame Bovary* we experience the realism of the psychological portrait of Emma, together with the realism of the scrupulous description of the houses, the villages, the landscapes, etc. That is, here we see Flaubert *miming or imitating*. He is miming or imitating modern research methods building on meticulous observation and the style of scientific texts being true to fact, consistent and exhaustive. That is why the term chosen for what Flaubert is doing in Madame Bovary, namely *naturalistic realism*, is a well-chosen term: the objects of comparison are topological descriptions, articles on engineering, psychiatric reports etcetera.

Other sorts of realism can be found in saga-realism, historical realism, social realism, everyday realism and many other kinds of realism. The only requirement for fictional realism – at least as an analytical concept – is that the fictional text, in this respect, should mime or imitate a comparable more or less coherent non-fictional text-corpus or style of writing.

To secure realism in fictional texts, it is important to notice though, that not every kind of mimicry will work. The texts mimed or imitated in a fictional text should comply with the Gricean maxims. They must – for their part – be *real* as texts, that is: informative, truthful, relevant and correct.[71]

Integrating this in our considerations we are now able to present a reliable definition of literary realism: a fictional text – a novel, a short story, a fairy tale – is a realistic text – in the sense of literary realism – to the degree that it shows similarities with texts which lives up to the Gricean maxims of informativeness, truthfulness and relevance.[72] It should be remembered that since the text in literary realism is presupposed to be fictional it is, of course, as the fictional text complying with the maxim of correctness.

As can be seen, this definition represents a confirmation of Plato's and Aristotle's theory of fictional realism: *realism in fictional literature is mimesis*.

Literary realism is a kind of fictionality. This means that the parameter of realism is not an independent one. Facing this, it could be interesting to ask if it is possible to make fictional realism an independent parameter – or rather to see realism as an exemplification of a more general, wholly independent parameter. Is this possible?

Since literary realism is a kind of comparison – we are comparing fictional with non-fictional texts – then a way to do this is to generalize this comparison to texts in general. It seems that we can do this. When evaluating texts as more or less realistic, we are, as we have seen, relating them to non-fictional standard texts: to recipes, to manuals, to contracts, to reports of different kinds, to stories, etc. each delivering their measure of centrality. But this measure is independent of whether the text is fictional or not. To put up classification standards is normally to create conditions for finding core cases and borderline cases, and this is the case for texts in general, too. So, a more general parameter for comparison of texts as instances of fictional realism seems to be *text prototypicality*: how close to a standard for a given type of text, S, is a given text, A.[73]

This means that the headline for this section – if we want to level it with the headlines figurativity, tropicity and fictionality – perhaps, should have been not degree of realism, but rather text prototypicality.

The concept of literary realism shares – as we have already hinted at – an important property with the tropes. First of all, we have a comparison or simi-

[71] It is, of course, not possible to mime another fictional text. Miming a fictional text would be to pretend pretence. And that is still pretence: a group of actors engaged in a play embedded in a play are still engaged in playing.

[72] By this definition we not only have classified degrees of realism, but also degrees of departures from realism: fairy tales, phantasy, science fiction, gothic, satire etc. Perhaps these departures from realism can be parameterized. I will not, though, go into this here.

[73] If this wider concept of text prototypicality is applied to the fictional text then this implies a corruption of the modified maxim of correctness too. Grice's original maxim of correctness, his maxim of manner, would, however, probably let such texts pass more easily.

larity relation (and a comparison to standards of the normal, the natural, the possible, the realistic) both in literary realism and in metaphors. And the marker for identifying, on the one hand, literary realism and, on the other hand, metaphor is also quite similar. In both cases we have a flouting of one or several of the Gricean maxims. This means that we must expect borderline cases where it is difficult to decide whether the text represents a breach of the Gricean maxim of correctness in the direction of tropicity or a breach of the Gricean maxims as a whole in the direction of a loss of reality.[74]

However, we also have important divergences. Where the tropes are mostly (but not always) bound to the singular sentence, fictionality and literary realism, are mostly (but not exclusively) bound to whole texts.

8 Conclusion

While tropes and fiction has been subjected to a substantial amount of attention during the last forty or fifty years, the question of literary realism has hardly been touched on, at least not in an appropriate manner. Probably, one of the reasons is that realism – in postmodern literary theory – has been considered a projective or constructed category. Here, realism is reduced to a sort of stylistic trick, as, for instance, with Roland Barthes who, in the headline of one of his essays, refers to realism as a means to create "the reality effect" (cf. Barthes 1989). This conception of realism I have tried to counter by showing how important philosophical realism is for obtaining a decent concept of literary realism. First, I have tried to show how important it, in the first place, is to separate philosophical realism from literary realism (instead of conflating them or neglect philosophical realism altogether). Secondly, I have also tried to make it clear that a proper concept of literary realism cannot be obtained without defining it in terms of philosophical realism. The best way to understand literary realism is by seeing it as a parasitic or etiolated variant of literal talk and writing that builds on philosophical realism.

In fact, *the assumption of realism* in the philosophical sense has occupied us not just in connection with literary realism, but has, actually, accompanied us all through the investigation of the four parameters of figurativity, tropicity, fictionality and (literary) realism.

Let us then sum up from our discussion how the relationship between philosophical realism – referred to below by the words "real" and "reality" – and realism in literature in general is to be understood mediated by the Gricean maxims:

[74] Are the events occurring in Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (Carroll 1865) ~~metaphors~~, or are they merely effects of a defective miming of a text referring to reality? This is not always an easy question to answer.

(10) H tropes

1. *Figurativity*: The figures in a literary part of a text are a *real* phenomenon. They lay out there in the world. They are not in any sense semiotic. They exist in their own right irrespective of whether they are identified by us or not. And because of this independency it is a VIOLATION OF THE GRICEAN MAXIM OF RELEVANCE which makes us suspect that the text is etiolated or void, that is, *unreal*, not living up to the Gricean maxims.
2. *Tropicity*: The tropes in a literary part of a text are related to *reality* in the sense that they are dependent on the public world. When we meet a ~~metaphor~~, we are identifying it because of its falling short of *reality*. What the ~~metaphor~~ is "saying" is something that *reality* – as it is engraved in the meanings of our words – forbids us to say. That is: the ~~metaphor~~ represents a VIOLATION OF THE GRICEAN MAXIMS OF CORRECTNESS (FOR METAPHORS), TRUTH (FOR IRONY, HYPERBOLE AND LITOTES), INFORMATIVENESS (FOR TAUTOLOGY AND SIMILE) AND RELEVANCE (FOR SYMBOLS AND ALLEGORY) in order to help us reinstalling *reality* through our inferential gifts.
3. *Fictionality*: The fictionality of a text – normally a whole text – is related to *reality* as suspense of that *reality*. In that way it re-affirms *reality*. Fictionality borrows from reality in order to let us play in a certain distance from *reality*. It represents a VIOLATION OF THE GRICEAN MAXIM OF TRUTH in order to establish its own fictional reality.
4. *(Degrees of) realism*: The realism of a text is not the same as a *reality* referred to. It is a reflected form of realism miming *realistic* texts, that is, texts complying with the Gricean maxims. That is, in a violation of the Gricean maxim of truth, derived from its being fictional, a new "reality" – a fictional reality – is put up.

(11) H trope
H trope
H trope
(12)

As we have seen, there is an intimate interplay between philosophical realism, literary realism and the Gricean maxims from (1) to (4). Here, the relationship between philosophical realism and literary realism is systematically established via a breach with or flouting of one or several of the Gricean maxims. We can illustrate this by listing some examples where the arrow is an implicature generated inference by the hearer or reader:

(1)



"This is (probably) literature."

reality (in a philosophical sense)

(2)

flouting the maxim of correctness (metaphor)

"Men think of sex constantly."

unreal pictorial object

paraphrases relating to **reality**



flouting the maxim of correctness (metaphor)

"Juliet is the sun"

"Juliet is my beloved"

Incorrect formulation of a proposition

paraphrases relating literally to **reality**

flouting the maxim of relevance (symbol)

"Now, we want peace"

pointless in context

paraphrases relating to **reality**

flouting the maxim of relevance (symbol)

[The Ugly Duckling]

"A genius always makes his name"

pointless in context

paraphrases relating to **reality**

flouting the maxim of informativeness (tautology)

"Boys are boys"

"Boys behave in their special way different from girls and grown-ups"

Uninformative proposition

paraphrases relating to **reality**

(3)

[HELMER goes into his room. The MAID ushers in Mrs. LINDE, who is in travelling dress, and shuts the door.] Mrs. Linde [in a dejected and timid voice]. "How do you do, Nora?"
Ibsen (1879)

pretended reality (being)

flouting all the maxims except correctness (dramatic realism)

["This is fictional"]

"The Nellie, a cruising yawl, swung to her anchor without a flutter of the sails, and was at rest. ..."
Conrad (1899)

pretended reality (being)

flouting the maxim of truth (literary realism)

["This is fictional"]

(4)

"The Nellie, a cruising yawl, swung to her anchor without a flutter of the sails, and was at rest. ..."
Conrad (1899)

pretended reality

flouting the maxim of truth (degree of realism)

[This is a literary realistic report]

As can be seen, this way of characterizing realism refutes a crude projectivistic conception of realism according to which realism is merely a style. If realism

were merely a style, it could be put at the same level as other sorts of styles. But that is not possible in our characterization of realism. Here, we find a hierarchical relationship between two sorts of realism, philosophical realism and literary realism.

For a projectivist (1) – (4) are chimeras. Let us see why the projectivists cannot be right in rejecting (1) – (4)?

Everything stands and falls with philosophical realism. That is, with the supposition that (1) the Gricean maxims are complied with, and that (2) the compliance with the Gricean maxim of truthfulness consists in letting the asserted propositions correspond to the language-independent facts.

According to the projectivists this is not possible. We cannot – so the argument goes – compare language with reality without using language. All facts are language impregnated. Or as Jacques Derrida, provocatively, has stated it: "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte." (Derrida 1976 (French 1967): 158).

This is gibberish. Correspondence to facts in the world is, of course, not established via language, but via thought embedded in perception and action. It is the correspondence between thought and world in perception and action that counts. When I see a boiling kettle on the stove, it has nothing to do with the fact that I have formulated, or am able to formulate this fact in language (which I can if I have learned a language). The reason why I see the kettle on the stove is the fact that it is placed on the stove and I have the ability to see it, and this has nothing to do with my mastering of a language in which I can state this fact.

Because we have a language-independent world, and we can perceive and act independently of the using of language, (1) – (4) is not a chimera. It is real. As to (1): language expressions are *real* physical phenomena in the world existing independently of whether they have been assigned a meaning or not; and as to (2): manmade more or less awkward physical pictures are *real* as starting points for making guesses as to what is communicated, and propositions referring to such physical pictures refer to something *real*, the same goes for paraphrases, which *really and literally* state facts about the world as implicature initiated interpretations of such pictures; as to (3) and (4): fictionality is something that, despite being not real, presupposes *reality* as a standard of comparison.

All those distinctions are clear and simple distinctions *indirectly* confirming realism. If we choose to give up realism in favour of projectivism they will collapse: philosophical realism will be the same as literary realism as merely ways of putting words together; metaphor will appear as continuous with literal talk; and truth will be indistinguishable from what is going on in theatres.

This I do not find satisfying.

Choosing philosophical realism means that literature has to be thought of as parasitic on non-literary texts. That does not make literature merely a means of entertaining and leisure. Literature is – as it is the defined through

the four parameters we have attended to – in my judgment primarily aesthetically defined. To choose figurativity, tropicity, fiction and realism is to choose a path of aesthetic appreciation. That does not mean that it could not – at the same time – be, for instance, of cognitive importance. That is one of Kant's achievements to have seen that. When choosing the path of aesthetics, one is choosing non-instrumentalism. But, one is not, thereby, abstaining from practicing cognitive skills. On the contrary: celebration of the beautiful and the sublime is, actually, at the same time a celebration of mastery – mastery of technical skills in dealing with nature and mastery of social skills in dealing with other persons, and here literature has its mission beyond furthering pleasure, too: The reading of literature is also an initiation into forms of life, which enhance the ability to make distinctions in perception and action and serves as an instrument for cultivating empathy towards other persons and furthers moralization – and through that real autonomy in the true Kantian sense of the word.

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